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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Background 
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) is a policy area whose importance has 
grown over the past two decades. The areas it covers – migration and asylum, freedom of 
movement in the EU, judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters, police cooperation, 
and data protection in the security context – go to the heart of Europe’s future. Brexit 
poses both challenges and opportunities for European developments in this area. But the 
timelines for negotiations under Article 50 are extremely tight to achieve orderly future 
arrangements before the UK leaves the EU, in principle in March 2019. In the time allowed, 
it may be very difficult to reach even transitional arrangements that ensure the necessary 
legal certainty and procedural checks and balances in this area, particularly in light of the 
UK’s position (at the time of writing) towards the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and the domestication of the rights and principles of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms (the EU Charter), in particular as they concern the protection of 
personal data. 
 
Key findings  
This study makes a number of findings in the different areas covered by the AFSJ. 
 
Border Checks, asylum and immigration, including free movement of persons 
If there is no EU-UK deal on citizens’ rights after Brexit, British citizens and their third-
country national family members will have to comply with the Schengen Border Code and 
the EU immigration acquis to enter and reside in the EU. EU Migration legislation (or, where 
applicable, national laws) will apply to them. EU26 nationals (leaving aside Irish nationals, 
who may benefit from a bilateral arrangement) seeking to enter and reside in the UK will 
need to fulfil British immigration rules, which include a quarterly cap on labour migration 
and financial requirements to bring in third country national spouses. The status of EU 
Member States’ citizens and British citizens resident in either the UK or the EU after Brexit 
is far from being resolved despite the recent agreement between the two sides. At present 
it appears that immigration between the UK and the EU26 (not including Ireland if there is 
a bilateral agreement) will be, in any case, much more complex and expensive. 
 
The UK does not participate in Phase 2 of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
and will no longer be bound by Phase 1. It will no longer automatically participate in the 
Dublin system nor have access to the European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) database. 
 
Judicial cooperation 
There has been limited discussion so far about the future of judicial cooperation between 
the UK and the EU27 but it seems clear that judicial cooperation in both civil and 
criminal matters will take much longer and be more expensive if there is no deal 
between the EU and UK after Brexit.  Even with a deal on Brexit, it could take a long 
time to reach agreement to replicate the current arrangements and this is unlikely to be 
resolved by March 2019. 
 
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters is a key element in combating serious and 
organised crime and terrorism, so there is a mutual interest in seeking agreement but the 
area is both politically sensitive and technical therefore it is difficult to find solutions 
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quickly. A failure to agree on transitional and future arrangements in the field of 
international family law risks leaving a serious gap in the legal framework for proceedings 
involving children, which could affect EU citizens with family connections to the UK.  There 
is an urgent need to start exploring the practical future options at a technical level 
but the UK’s current position on the CJEU and the rights contained in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, in particular data protection, is potentially a serious impediment to 
future agreements on judicial cooperation. 
 
Police cooperation 
Police cooperation within the EU is part of a wider global network of police and security 
cooperation that needs to be taken into account in Brexit negotiations.  Future cooperation 
of some sort will be needed to ensure continued security and to combat cross-border crime.  
But negotiations should reflect the need to protect the integrity of the EU system while 
exploring practical options for cooperation with the UK post Brexit.  The UK has been an 
important stakeholder in developing police cooperation in practice but UK political 
constraints have also put a break on closer cooperation in some areas.  The UK’s 
departure offers an opportunity for a new drive towards strengthened EU 
cooperation in this area. 
 
Data protection 
When the UK ceases to be a Member State of the EU, it will be treated as a third country, 
so any EU-UK data transfer deal for law enforcement purposes must fulfil the 
requirements of EU data protection law for third-country data transfer.  This will 
need to be based on an adequacy decision in relation to UK data protection 
standards which is in the interests of both the UK and the EU.  The UK Government has 
embraced the idea of the adequacy decision scheme for future EU-UK data transfer for law 
enforcement purposes, although whether it will secure that decision is questionable.  Any 
future deal facilitating data exchange between the EU and UK in the context of law 
enforcement must maintain a high standard of data protection as reflected in the EU 
Charter and secondary legislation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The prospect of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU following the June 2016 Brexit referendum 
marks a major political shift in the development of the EU and international frameworks 
more broadly. This is the first time that a Member State has sought to leave the EU, and 
the way in which the withdrawal is conducted could have significant consequences for the 
EU as well as the UK. The Brexit process must be viewed holistically, including:  
  
 the details of the withdrawal agreement and any transitional arrangements.  
 the possibility of future agreements. 
 the wider impact on relations with states and organisations outside the EU; and 
 the impact on the coherence and integrity of the EU itself. 
 
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is a policy area whose importance has grown 
over the past two decades. The areas it covers – migration and asylum, freedom of 
movement in the EU, judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters, police cooperation 
and data protection in the security context – go to the heart of Europe’s future. They touch 
on sensitive areas including the right to family life and the rights of the child, security, 
privacy, and the rule of law. The outcomes of the Brexit negotiations could have far-
reaching consequences for individual lives in the UK and the EU, whatever the nationality of 
the individuals concerned. The success of the AFSJ has meant that free movement of 
people around Europe has become commonplace, with people moving easily for work, 
study, or personal reasons in the Union without thinking about national borders. The impact 
of Brexit on individual lives is often characterised by politicians and the media as a binary 
issue between UK citizens in Europe and EU27 citizens in the UK. The reality is much more 
complex, widespread, and nuanced: many people live, study, work, and form families 
across multiple borders with complex identities based on national and EU citizenship. The 
AFSJ has allowed the EU to become a union of societies: breaking up this aspect of the EU 
may prove to be one of the most difficult aspects of Brexit, with acute and profound 
impacts on those affected.  
 
Migration and freedom of movement in the EU generated intense debate in the run-up to 
the UK referendum. The sensitivity of these issues had already led to the UK staying 
outside the Schengen area. But as Brexit negotiations progress, the domestic debate in the 
UK is changing. In June 2017, it was reported that since the Brexit vote there had been a 
96% drop in EU nurses registering in the UK.1 In July 2017 the Home Secretary Amber 
Rudd commissioned research on EU worker contributions in the UK.2 It is astonishing that 
this research was requested a year after the referendum, but this gives an indication of the 
political flux in the UK and the lack of accurate information behind the migration stories 
that fueled anti-EU sentiment in the UK. In August 2017, net migration to the UK dropped 
to its lowest figure in three years, largely driven by the Brexit effect.3 Figures published by 
the Office of National Statistics also revealed that the ways in which immigration statistics 
in areas like student migration were reported and dealt with by the government4 was 
                                                 
1 The Health Foundation, New nurse registrants from the EU, 01.12.2017 at: http://www.health.org.uk/chart-96-
drop-nurses-eu-last-july. 
2 Home Office, Home Secretary commissions major study on EU workers (press release), 27.07.2017 at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-commissions-major-study-on-eu-workers. 
3Office for National Statistics, Migration Statistics Quarterly Report, August 2017 at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/%20bulle
tins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/august2017. 
4See ‘Theresa May under fire as student visa myth exposed’, The Guardian, 24.09.2017 at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/aug/24/pressure-grows-for-immigration-targets-to-exclude-
foreign-students.  
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misleading.5 Given the shifting sands of UK politics and the slow revelation of the effect of 
Brexit, along with more accurate reporting on the reality and benefits of freedom of 
movement, it is difficult to assess at this stage how the UK negotiating position may change 
in this area till March 2019.  
 
Following several terrorist attacks with cross-border implications in recent years, security 
and cooperation in the fight against terrorism have become increasingly important 
concerns. The UK’s pragmatic approach to the AFSJ has allowed it to drive forward 
important developments like the EAW while choosing which policy areas and legislative 
instruments it wishes to engage with – effectively cherry-picking the policies that suit its 
national agenda. The UK’s record in this area and its value to Europe is mixed. On the one 
hand, the UK provides a useful bridge to other international and global networks for 
security and criminal justice cooperation, such as ‘Five Eyes’.6 On the other hand, the UK’s 
concerns about sovereignty in the criminal justice arena have put a brake on deeper and 
more coordinated development of the EU criminal justice system. The UK has proved 
resistant to the supranational oversight provided by the CJEU. It has also resisted the 
development of a high level of protection of personal data in EU law, which forms the basis 
for enhanced cooperation and mutual trust in this field. As such, Brexit poses both a risk 
and an opportunity for the EU. Protecting the interests of the EU27 and EU institutions to 
ensure the security of people within the EU will require a complex assessment of the 
consequences of different approaches to Brexit, both for internal EU relations and for EU 
relations with the wider world. In the context of Brexit, there are profound questions raised 
by the AFSJ around fundamental rights, the rule of law, the role of supra-national courts, 
sovereignty and the separation of powers within and across borders. These issues are 
extremely difficult to unpick, but it is important that the fundamental ideals of the AFSJ 
should not be lost in the labyrinth of technicalities in the negotiations.  This study will 
highlight some of the ways this risk might be addressed. 
 
EU-UK negotiations for Brexit started in June 2017, but at the time of writing, and despite 
recent progress in discussions on the primary issues of citizens’ rights, the exit bill, and the 
Irish border, there are no conclusions in the area of the AFSJ. While the EU has produced 
several position papers with technical details relevant to the AFSJ, they are overshadowed 
by the difficult political reality of the UK’s intransigence on the fundamental issue of CJEU 
jurisdiction.7 Given this political blockage, it is difficult to see how the technical negotiations 
needed for an orderly withdrawal from the AFSJ will be achieved within the Article 50 
timescale. The UK Government issued a number of relevant position papers over the 
summer of 2017 on judicial cooperation in civil matters, data protection, and judicial 
oversight, but these were dismissed by EU interlocutors as unsatisfactory due to their lack 
of realism and detail.8 The outcome of the recent British General Election and the difficulties 
encountered by the Conservative Party in forming a government make it harder than ever 
to predict how the UK’s political approach to Brexit may change over the remaining 
negotiating period. But it is important to explore a number of possible options, including 
the challenges of allowing the UK to opt in to certain policies and the risks associated with 
                                                 
5 See Office for National Statistics, What’s happening with international student migration? , 24.08.2017 at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/articles/w
hatshappeningwithinternationalstudentmigration/2017-08-24.  
6 The partner agencies of the US National Security Agency (NSA) in ‘Five Eyes’ are the UK Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Canadian Communications Security Establishment, Australian Digital 
Signals Directorate, and New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau. 
7 Publication is ongoing and current position papers can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/Brexit-
negotiations/negotiating-documents-article-50-negotiations-united-kingdom_en. 
8 UK position papers are available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/Brexit. The EU response can be 
found at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3043_en.htm. 
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the UK withdrawing, as well as the opportunities for the EU to develop closer cooperation 
and push forward new policy objectives in the AFSJ once the UK leaves the EU. 
 
The timeline for the negotiations is very tight. With Article 50 triggered in March 2017, an 
agreement for withdrawal needs to be concluded by the end of March 2019 (unless the 
deadline is postponed through a unanimous decision of the European Council and the UK, 
as Article 50(3) allows). Within the time allowed, it will be very difficult to reach even 
transitional arrangements that ensure the necessary legal certainty and procedural checks 
and balances in this area. It will be up to the Member States and EU institutions to decide 
whether or not it is in their interest to extend the Article 50 deadline if the UK requests it. 
Prime Minister Theresa May has said recently that she would like to have a two year 
‘transitional period’, but it is unclear whether this is, in practice, a request to extend the 
Article 50 deadline. With so many different political, economic, and legal interests at play in 
the Brexit negotiations, it is impossible at this stage to predict the eventual outcome or 
impact of Brexit on the AFSJ. Brexit negotiations are also ongoing alongside domestic 
political debates around the EU Withdrawal Bill in the UK. 
   
This study, covering developments up until the end of September 2017, provides an 
overview of some of the implications for the AFSJ of Brexit. The broad scope of this study 
makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive analysis of all the issues or to cover the full 
breadth of legislation: each section or sub-section merits a separate in-depth analysis to 
accompany technical negotiations. The study therefore focuses on some of the most 
important policy areas and pieces of legislation that will be most acutely affected by Brexit.  
The authors seek to highlight key risks and opportunities for the EU and its citizens that 
should be taken into account in the Brexit process. The study is multi-disciplinary, and the 
different backgrounds and perspectives of the authors are reflected in the text. Where 
possible, we make some suggestions for action that can be taken to mitigate negative 
consequences. We recognise that the AFSJ is only one part of a much wider and more 
complex negotiation whose wide-ranging political and practical aspects render it a highly 
volatile and unpredictable process.   
  
There are some fundamental issues underpinning the AFSJ that are beyond the scope of 
this study. These include the importance of the rights and principles set out in the EU 
Charter in the Article 50 process and as a basis for cooperation outside the EU; the status 
of EU citizenship and the way the EU protects the rights of its citizens, including British EU 
citizens wherever they live, in the Brexit process; the role and importance of the CJEU in 
the future of the EU; and the complexities of borders in Europe through dialogue on the 
Irish border, and eventually the border with Gibraltar. Although these issues are not 
explored in detail in this study, they should be kept at the forefront of Brexit negotiations 
because their implications go far beyond Brexit and will help shape the EU’s future. 
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2. MAPPING BREXIT AND THE AFSJ 
Over the past thirty years, the UK has taken, through a complex series of opt-outs and opt-
ins, a pick-and-mix approach to its involvement with the development of AFSJ policies and 
legislation. This approach has been driven by a combination of domestic political pressures 
and pragmatic operational needs. Brexit may bring the conflict between those two factors 
on certain sensitive issues (in particular continued cooperation for mutual security) into 
sharp definition, in both the UK and the EU.   
 
This chapter will map out the UK’s involvement in specific issues within the AFSJ, as these 
are the areas that are likely to be most directly affected by Brexit. It should be noted that 
all of these policy areas have significant implications for the fundamental rights protected 
by the EU Charter as interpreted by the CJEU. Although the application of the EU Charter is 
technically limited to EU law and therefore, following withdrawal, will cease to apply in the 
UK, concerns will be raised about the adequacy of UK law if the EU Charter’s rights and 
principles beyond those contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
are not reflected in its domestic law, in particular with reference to the right to protection of 
personal data.9 The draft of the EU Withdrawal Bill (at the time of writing) and its 
explanatory notes indicate that – unlike the main body of EU law implemented by the UK to 
date – the EU Charter will not be carried over into UK domestic legislation.10 The UK 
Government’s stance towards the EU Charter raises serious questions as to why the UK 
feels it appropriate to not domesticate the rights and principles protected by the EU Charter 
at the point of Brexit.   
 
The CJEU has the jurisdiction to annul EU-third-country agreements that are incompatible 
with EU Treaties including fundamental rights.11 It can also give an opinion on the legality 
of agreements with third countries before they enter into force.12  Therefore, the CJEU will 
be able to rule, as a minimum, on the legality of future EU acts agreed with the UK in the 
AFSJ and on the Withdrawal Agreement itself. Discussion of the CJEU in the UK political 
arena does not seem to recognise this. Although not the focus of this study, the settlement 
of the application of rights contained in the EU Charter, in particular personal data 
protection, and the jurisdiction of the CJEU are likely to be fundamental issues in the 
negotiation of future agreements in this area because of the sensitivity of the issues at 
stake and the potential impact on fundamental rights. These two issues, therefore, set the 
parameters for any further discussions on the AFSJ. Without agreement there, any 
assessment of technical details is of limited practical value.  
 
2.1. The UK’s participation in legislation and policies on border 
checks, asylum and immigration, including free movement of 
persons 
 
The UK has had the right to opt in or out of measures adopted in the AFSJ. It has chosen to 
opt out of almost all the ASFJ immigration measures. It has opted into only the whole of 
the first phase of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which makes this aspect 
                                                 
9 EU Charter, Article 51. 
10 EU (Withdrawal) Bill, clause 5(4). The explanatory notes (Bill 5-EN), in paragraph 99, explain that this is 
because the EU Charter ‘did not create new rights, but rather codified rights and principles which already existed 
in EU law and such rights and principles will be saved under the Bill (in clauses 2-4). 
11 TFEU, Article 263. 
12 TFEU, Article 218 (11). 
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of Brexit less complicated from the perspective of the UK legal order (although it will be 
highly relevant in terms of the future status of UK nationals in the EU). It should be noted 
that the UK Government has given indications that it will treat Irish nationals differently 
than other EU nationals, taking into account earlier agreements for a Common Travel Area 
and the specific needs for addressing the issue of the UK-Irish border. 
  
From its inception in 1985, the UK opted out of the Schengen acquis on free movement of 
persons. It never participated in the inter-governmental development of the Schengen 
acquis; when this was transformed into EU law through the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, the 
UK remained outside the system. The legal mechanism for this was a protocol to the 
Amsterdam Treaty that has since been carried through to subsequent treaties. The UK 
Government has expressed concerns that the British-Irish land border does not become a 
so-called hard border.13 As Ireland also has an opt out of the Schengen acquis (though not 
of the right of free movement of persons), there is no reason why Ireland would have to 
apply the Schengen Borders Code to the Irish-British border (unless Ireland joins the 
Schengen system). 
 
The UK was among the original signatories of the 1990 Dublin Convention, which set out 
rules regarding Member State responsibility for asylum seekers and the determination of 
their claims.14 Under the protocol negotiated to the Amsterdam Treaty, the UK is entitled to 
opt in or out of any measure in the field of asylum. The UK chose to opt in to the first 
phase of the CEAS in 2004 and 2005. The core measures (as recast) are the Dublin system 
(including the EURODAC fingerprint data base, originally designed to assist in the 
identification of asylum seekers and the state through which they entered),15 the reception 
conditions directive,16 the qualification directive,17 and the procedures directive.18 However, 
when these core measures were renewed in the Second Phase of the CEAS in 2011–2013, 
the UK opted out of all of them except EURODAC (finger print database)19 and the Dublin 
III regulation.20 
 
                                                 
13 See ‘The Hardest border’, BBC, 2017 at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/The_hardest_border.  
14 Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum lodged in one of the 
Member States of the European Communities – Dublin Convention, signed 15.05.1990, OJ C 254, 19.8.1997, pp. 
1-12.  
15 Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protected lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person 
(recast), OJ L 180-31, 29.6.2013; and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the establishment of ‘EURODAC’ for the comparison of 
fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the Member State responsible for examining the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protected lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with EURODAC data 
by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT 
systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (recast), OJ L 180/31, 29.6.2013. 
16 Council of the European Union, Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and Council of 26 June 2013 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protect (recast), OJ L 180/96, 28.6.2013.  
17 Council of the European Union, Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for 
the content of the protection granted (recast), OJ L 337/9, 20.12.2011. 
18 Council of the European Union, Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), OJ L 180/60, 
29.6.2013.  
19 Regulation 603/2013, op. cit.  
20 Peers, S., Moreno-Lax, V., Garlick, M. and Guild, E., ‘EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Text and Commentary): 
Second Revised Edition’, Vol. 3: EU Asylum Law. Leiden: Brill, 2015.  
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The UK joined the EU after the rules on free movement of persons had been determined. 
The 1957 EEC Treaty provided for free movement of persons, in particular workers, the 
self-employed, and service providers and recipients. The transitional period for achieving 
free movement of EU nationals ended in 1968, before the UK’s entry into the EU, with all 
the secondary legislation necessary for the achievement of free movement of EU nationals 
having been adopted. Thus, when the UK joined the EU it opted in to a fully established 
system. 
 
As regards secondary legislation, the rules on free movement of EU citizens remained 
unchanged until the early 1990s. At that point in time, the EU adopted three directives 
providing for free movement of pensioners, students, and the economically inactive. The 
UK participated in the negotiations of these directives. A major overhaul of the secondary 
legislation took place in 2004, resulting in the adoption of Directive 2004/38. This directive 
incorporated the right of free movement for pensioners, students and the economically 
inactive, created the status of permanent residence after a five-year qualifying stay in a 
host Member State, and enhanced protection against expulsion. Since then two secondary 
instruments have been adopted, one to provide further protection for workers and the 
other for remedies. The UK participated in the negotiations for all these measures. 
 
In relation to family reunification, for British citizens already living in the EU25 with third-
country national family members, the rules of Directive 2003/86 will apply. In Denmark 
and Ireland, national law can be applied to them. In EEA states and Switzerland, which are 
not bound by Directive 2003/86, family reunification for third-country national family 
members of British citizens will be a matter of national law after Brexit. The status of third-
country national family members of EU citizens in the UK after Brexit is a topic for 
negotiation, with the latest documents indicating that there are still unresolved issues.21 
2.2. UK participation in legislation and policies on judicial 
cooperation in civil and criminal matters 
 
When considering the UK’s role in judicial cooperation, it is worth noting that the 
complexity of the relationship between the UK and the EU in this area is exacerbated by the 
fact that the UK is made up of three separate jurisdictions (England and Wales, Scotland, 
and Northern Ireland) with quite different legal systems, particularly in relation to criminal 
and family law. Gibraltar also has a different legal system.22    
  
The UK and its overseas territories have shared waters with the EU27 and three land 
borders (between Northern Ireland and Ireland; between Gibraltar and Spain; and between 
the British Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia and the Republic of Cyprus). It is 
quite likely that people around those land borders with transient workforces and families 
that may straddle borders will be particularly affected by any reduction in the UK’s ability to 
cooperate in cross-border civil and family disputes or in combating cross-border crime. 
 
Like other areas of the AFSJ, the UK has had the possibility of opting in or opting out to a 
range of judicial cooperation measures. It has chosen to opt in to approximately 30 judicial 
cooperation measures on a wide variety of issues, some relating to harmonisation of 
standards and others relating to operational cross-border cooperation. 
                                                 
21See ‘Comparison of EU/UK positions on citizens’ rights’, Joint Technical Note, 31.08.2017 at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/641334/2017-08-30_-
_EU_UK_Comparison_Table_CR_AUGUST_day_2_FINAL_AGREED_VERSION_AGREED_with_Cion_V2.2.pdf . 
22 Other British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies are all separate jurisdictions, but they are not 
currently in the EU (while Gibraltar is). 
The implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU for the AFSJ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 15 
  
In 2013 the UK Government notified the Council of Ministers that it was going to exercise a 
block opt-out from the pre-Lisbon police and criminal justice measures.23 It indicated that it 
would seek to re-join thirty-five of those same measures, which it did (from 1 December 
2014) to ensure their seamless application. The UK has had the opportunity to decide about 
opting in or out of post-Lisbon measures. While it has not chosen to opt in across the 
board, it has done so for certain significant instruments.24 Most recently, on 20 July 2017, 
the UK Government announced that it would opt in to the new regulation on mutual 
recognition of freezing and confiscation orders.25 
2.2.1. Criminal judicial cooperation 
 
Reflecting the mutual trust between EU Member States, judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters has developed in the EU to meet the threats of terrorism and organised crime 
across borders and to allow for enhanced and fast-track cooperation in cross-border 
criminal matters. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters encompasses three main strands 
of legislation: 
 
 Legislation and treaty provisions establishing judicial cooperation bodies: e.g., 
Eurojust.26 
 Legislation establishing minimum standards in criminal legislation: e.g., the Terrorism 
Directive,27 the Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia,28 and the Directive on 
the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to communicate 
upon arrest.29 and 
 Legislation allowing for mutual recognition as the basis for enhanced cooperation: e.g., 
the European Arrest Warrant (EAW).30 
    
While UK engagement in these policy areas has been patchy and inconsistent, in some 
areas the UK has made very important contributions to EU judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters.   
 
Judicial cooperation bodies, in particular Eurojust and the European Judicial Network (EJN), 
allow judges and prosecutors from Member States to coordinate cross-border cooperation 
more effectively. Eurojust’s mission, as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) Article 85 outlines, is ‘to support and strengthen coordination and cooperation 
between national investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crime 
                                                 
23 The Lisbon Treaty communitarised the field of criminal justice cooperation as of 1 December 2014. Article 10 of 
Protocol 36 to the Treaty gave the UK the possibility of a ‘block op-out’ from all pre-Lisbon measures.  
24 The UK opted in to the Directive on the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, which entered into 
force on 22.05.2017 at: 
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1450446176116&uri =CELEX:32014L0041.  
25 See Chapter 2.2. 
26 See Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening 
and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious 
crime, OJ L 138/14, 4.6.2009.  
27 See Council of the European Union, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating 
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, 
OJ L 88/6, 31.3.2017.  
28 Council of the European Union, Council Framework decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating 
certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ L 328/55, 6.12.2008.  
29 Council of the European Union, Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant 
proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with 
third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, OJ L 294/1, 6.11.2013.  
30 Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA), OJ L 190/1, 18.7.2002. 
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affecting two or more Member States […]’. TFEU Article 86 states that ‘in order to combat 
crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, the Council, by means of regulations 
adopted in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may establish a European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office from Eurojust’. Eurojust also funds and facilitates the creation of Joint 
Investigation Teams (JITs), which play a crucial role in combating cross-border serious and 
organised crime. The UK has been an active participant in Eurojust and the EJN.31 It has 
also been one of the main users of JITs.32 Brexit will mean that the UK will no longer have a 
voice in the development of judicial cooperation institutions like Eurojust. 
 
Legislation establishing minimum standards in criminal law across the EU serves various 
purposes. Many serious and organised types of crime (such as trafficking in human beings, 
terrorism and cybercrime) are committed across borders. A degree of relative 
harmonisation across national laws ensures that criminals cannot misuse those EU 
countries with the most lenient legal systems or establish 'safe havens' through legal 
loopholes. Common rules on procedural rights strengthen mutual trust between the 
judiciaries of Member States, facilitating cooperation and mutual recognition of judicial 
measures.  EU criminal law helps to prevent and punish serious offences against EU law in 
certain policy areas (such as protecting the environment).33 Brexit will have a minimal 
impact in criminal law, at least in the short term, since the UK has not opted in to all of the 
measures of this type and intends to transpose into domestic law any EU law that it has 
already implemented through Clauses 2 and 3 of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill. Since these 
measures relate to the harmonisation of laws rather than the legal basis for judicial 
cooperation as such, they should not be directly affected by the UK withdrawal from the EU 
in a practical sense. 
 
Mutual recognition instruments have transformed the ability of Member States to cooperate 
across borders. Compared to the more traditional mutual legal assistance and extradition 
tools that were available in the past, EU mutual recognition instruments significantly reduce 
the costs and time involved in surrendering suspects, exchanging evidence and freezing 
assets across borders. These instruments are based on the assumption that all EU Member 
States share common standards, in particular when it comes to the respect for and 
protection of human rights, and that CJEU jurisdiction provides certainty in terms of how 
these instruments are interpreted across the EU. Brexit is likely to have the biggest impact 
on the operation of mutual recognition instruments in proceedings and investigations 
involving the UK. 
 
Brexit will have implications on a technical level in a wide range of areas because UK 
participation in mutual recognition instruments is widespread. The EU Paper ‘Essential 
Principles on Ongoing Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ identifies several 
mutual recognition instruments that will need transitional provisions in the Withdrawal 
Agreement to ensure that ongoing procedures are not disrupted by Brexit.34 These include 
measures like the European Investigation Order (EIO),35 the EAW,36 the European 
                                                 
31See EJN, Evaluation report on the sixth round of mutual evaluations. The practical implementation and operation 
of the Decision setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime and of the Decision on 
the EJN. Report on United Kingdom, 12.5.2014 at: 
 https://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/%20libdocumentproperties.aspx?Id=1298.  
32 Eurojust , Annual Report 2016  at: http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/corporate/  
eurojust%20Annual%20Reports/ Annual%20Report%202016/AR2016_EN_web.pdf . 
33 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/criminal-law-policy/index_en.htm.  
34 European Commission, Essential Principles on Ongoing Police and Judicial cooperation in Criminal matters, TF-50 
8/2 – Commission to UK, 12.7.2017 at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/essential-
principles-ongoing-police-judicial_en_0.pdf . 
35 Council of the European Union,  Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 
2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ L 130/1, 01.5.2014.  
The implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU for the AFSJ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 17 
Protection Order (EPO),37 and also the recognition of financial penalties,38 custodial 
sentences,39 supervision measures,40 and confiscation orders.41 If there is a desire to 
continue cooperation with the UK in these areas following Brexit, separate arrangements 
with the UK as a third country will need to be agreed.  
2.2.2. Civil judicial cooperation 
 
Within the EU’s system of civil judicial cooperation, the UK participates in a range of 
instruments covering civil and commercial as well as family law. Civil judicial cooperation 
instruments are designed to facilitate the application of non-criminal law across borders in 
the EU, supporting the freedom of movement of people, services and goods. 
 
In the civil and commercial sphere, these include the Brussels I Recast Regulation on 
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments between EU Member States 
(1215/2012), the Rome I Regulation on applicable law in contracts (593/2008), the Rome 
II Regulation on applicable law in non-contractual obligations (864/2007), and the 
Insolvency Regulation on jurisdictional rules and applicable law and recognition of 
insolvency proceedings in cross-border insolvencies (1346/2000, 2015/848). In addition, 
the small claims (861/2007, revised by 2015/2421), enforcement order (805/2004), and 
order for payment (1896/2006) Regulations facilitate means for obtaining decisions on 
claims that can be enforced throughout the EU. 
 
In relation to family law, the most important instruments the UK participates in are the 
Brussels IIa Regulation (BIIa) on jurisdictional rules in matrimonial and parental 
responsibility matters and the recognition and enforcement of judgments (2201/2003), the 
Maintenance Regulation on rules for determining which court has jurisdiction for, and the 
recognition and enforcement of, maintenance decisions (4/2009), and the Regulation on 
protection measures in civil matters, including for victims of domestic violence (606/2013). 
In October 2016, the UK Government decided to opt in to the renegotiation of BIIa.   
Other cross-cutting instruments include the EU Service Regulation on rules for serving 
documents in other EU countries (2007/1393), the Taking of Evidence Regulation on 
cross-border processing of requests to take evidence (2001/1206), the Legal Aid 
Directive (2002/8) on granting legal aid in cross-border disputes, and the Mediation 
Directive (2008/52) on access to alternative dispute resolution and settlement of 
disputes through the use of mediation in cross-border disputes. 
The UK also participates in the EJN in Civil and Commercial Matters, which facilitates cross-
border cooperation for judges and practitioners and access to justice for those involved in 
disputes.42 
                                                                                                                                                            
36 2002/584/JHA, op. cit.  
37 Council of the European Union, Directive 2011/99/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on the European protection order, OJ L 338/2, 21.12.2011.  
38 Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties, OJ L 76/16, 22.3.2005. 
39 Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or 
measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, OJ L 327/27, 
5.12.2008. 
40 Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the 
application, between Member States of the European Union, of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions on 
supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention, OJ L 294/20, 11.11.2009. 
41 Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2006/783 of 6 October 2006 on the application of 
the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders, OJ L 328/59, 24.11.2006. 
42 Council of the European Union, Council Decision of 28 May 2001 establishing a European Judicial Network in civil 
and commercial matters (2001/470/EC), OJ L 174/25, 27.6.2001. 
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2.2.3. The UK’s participation in legislation and policies on police cooperation 
 
The UK is often seen as a leader and significant contributor to European police cooperation. 
It has opted in to around 20 police cooperation measures covering a wide range of issues, 
from Europol, security in relation to football matches, and information exchange in areas 
ranging from financial intelligence to criminal records and customs matters.  
 
The impact of Brexit on police cooperation in the EU cannot be divorced from the broader 
picture of intelligence cooperation and global information exchange that ensure EU security 
in many contexts. This includes bilateral and transatlantic arenas as well as the wider 
international context. Although not directly within the scope of EU competence or Brexit 
negotiations, they are likely to be affected by Brexit and may influence the strategic 
negotiating positions of both the EU and the UK. 
 
The UK participates in prominent EU measures on data exchange for law enforcement 
purposes, namely the Schengen Information System (SIS II),43 the European Criminal 
Records Information Systems (ECRIS),44 the EU Passenger Name Record (PNR),45, and the 
Prüm Decisions.46 Continued involvement in these systems after Brexit will need to be 
based on UK compliance with EU data protection standards. 
 
2.2.4. The UK’s participation in legislation and policies on the protection of personal data 
for the purposes of law enforcement 
 
The UK’s role in this area has been shaped by its ‘pick-and-choose’ approach. Protocol 21 
stipulates that Article 16 of the TFEU, which enshrines the right to protection of personal 
data, is applicable to the UK only for the EU police and judicial co-operation measures in 
which it participates.47 
 
The protection of personal data is recognised as a fundamental right by Article 8 of the EU 
Charter. Data protection standards in the context of law enforcement were initially 
governed by the 2008 Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.48 This 
was replaced by the 2016 Directive on protecting personal data processed for the purpose 
                                                 
43 Council of the European Union Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation 
and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), OJ L 205/63, 7.8.2007. 
44 Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the 
organisation and content of the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member 
States, OJ L 93/23, 7.4.2009; and Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the 
European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in application of Article 11 of Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA, OJ L 93/33, 7.4.2009. 
45 Council of the European Union, Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, OJ L 119/132, 27.4.2016. 
46 Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-
border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L 210/12, 6.8.2008; and 
Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping 
up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L 210/12, 
06.8.2008. 
47 Article 6 (a) of Protocol No. 21 annexed to TFEU Treaty on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in 
respect to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
48 Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, OJ L 
350/60, 30.12.2008. Hereafter cited as 2008 Framework Decision. 
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of criminal law enforcement.49 Following the UK’s block opt out from pre-Lisbon criminal 
and policing measures in accordance with Protocol 36 of the TFEU,50 the UK re-joined the 
2008 Framework Decision in April 2014 and transposed it into UK law by the Criminal 
Justice and Data Protection (Protocol 36) Regulations 2014.51 The 2008 Framework 
Decision regulated cross-border exchanges of personal data for law enforcement purposes. 
By contrast, the 2016 Directive covers not only data transfer between law enforcement 
authorities but also data processing activities performed by national law enforcement 
authorities for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences 
(Article 1). It does not cover data transfer between and by intelligence services, whose 
activities fall outside the scope of EU law.52 The 2016 Directive must be transposed into the 
national laws of EU Member States by 6 May 2018; given its ability to opt out, the UK is 
under no obligation to transpose it into national law by that time. Nevertheless, the UK 
Government announced in August 2017 that the Data Protection Bill would include the 
implementation of the 2016 Directive.53 Indeed, the first draft of the Bill incorporates data 
processing rules for law enforcement purposes and transposes the 2016 Directive into UK 
law.54 
 
The UK Government’s position in relation to data transfer for the purposes of law 
enforcement after Brexit is clear: it wishes to maintain that transfer. The UK Government 
confirmed that it will achieve this goal by seeking an adequacy decision.55 While this may 
be the UK’s desire, there is no guarantee that an adequacy decision will be granted. 
 
                                                 
49 Council of the European Union, Directive 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities 
for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA., OJ L 119, 04.5.2016. Hereafter cited as 2016 Directive. 
50 See House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, The UK’s 2014 Block Opt-Out Decision, note 1 at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmeuleg/762/76203.htm#note1. 
51 Hereafter cited as 2014 Regulations. The UK also re-joined Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA, which 
was also transposed by the 2014 Regulations. See Council of the European Union (2006), Council Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between 
law enforcement authorities, OJ L 386/89, 13.12.2006. 
52 2016 Directive, op. cit., article 2(3)(a). 
53 A New Data Protection Bill: Our Planned Reforms at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/635900/2017-08-07_DP_Bill_-_Statement_of_Intent.pdf.  
54 Data Protection Bill, part 3. For the first draft of the Data Protection Bill at: https://publications.   
parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2017-2019/0066/lbill_2017-20190066_en_1.htm. 
55 The UK wants to explore a UK-EU model for exchanging and protecting personal data, which could build on the 
existing adequacy model’ (emphasis added). See Department for Exiting the European The exchange and 
protection of personal data: A future partnership paper, 24.8.2017, note 4 at: 
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-exchange-and-protection-of-personal-data-a-future-
partnership-paper. 
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3. POLICIES ON BORDER CHECKS, ASYLUM AND 
IMMIGRATION, INCLUDING FREE MOVEMENT OF 
PERSONS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Assuming no EU-UK deal on rights after Brexit, British citizens will have to comply 
with the Schengen Border Code and the EU immigration acquis to enter and reside 
in the EU. 
 EU26 nationals (leaving aside Irish nationals who would benefit from a bilateral 
arrangement) seeking to enter and reside in the UK will need to fulfil British 
immigration rules (which include a quarterly cap on labour migrants); British 
nationals seeking to enter and reside in EU26 Member States will have to comply 
with EU migration legislation (or, where applicable, national laws). 
 The UK does not participate in Phase 2 CEAS and will no longer be bound by Phase 
1; it will no longer automatically participate in the Dublin system nor have access to 
the EURODAC database. 
 The position of EU27 and British citizens resident in either the UK or EU 27 post-
Brexit is far from being resolved, though both sides have clarified their starting 
positions. 
 Immigration between the UK and the EU26 (presumably not including Ireland) 
following Brexit without a deal will be much more complex and expensive.  
 
One of the most sensitive and complex issues which must be dealt with in the Brexit 
negotiations is the situation of EU27 nationals in the UK and British citizens in the EU27, 
including border checks. The UK has opted out of much of the AFSJ, including almost all the 
ASFJ immigration measures.56 It has opted into only the whole of the first phase of the 
CEAS, which makes this aspect of Brexit less complicated from the perspective of the UK 
and EU legal order. But as AFSJ immigration measures will apply to British citizens seeking 
to go to the EU27 after Brexit (unless some arrangement is made), they are relevant from 
that perspective. What is key to Brexit and the situation of EU27 citizens and British 
citizens after March 2019 is that EU27 citizens will be third-country nationals in the UK and 
British citizens in the EU27 will also be third-country nationals. This means that EU27 
citizens will be subject to British border and immigration law on entering and residing in the 
UK and that British citizens entering and seeking to reside in the EU27 will be subject to EU 
rules on third-country nationals supplemented (in so far as the system is not yet complete) 
by the national laws of the relevant country. This section takes into account the joint EU-UK 
note published in August 2017 and notes the UK’s request to its Migration Advisory 
Committee to prepare a detailed assessment of the role of EU citizens in the UK economy 
and society.57 
 
                                                 
56 See above Chapter 2 of this report. 
57 The joint EU-UK note can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-technical-note-on-
the-comparison-of-eu-uk-positions-on-citizens-rights; the UK request to the Migration Advisory Committee can be 
found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/migration-advisory-committee-mac-commissioned-by-   
government. 
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3.1. The role of the UK in policy development 
3.1.1. Borders and border checks on persons 
 
The UK did not participate in the inter-governmental development of the Schengen acquis 
on free movement of persons and chose to not join it at its inception in 1985. When the 
Schengen acquis was transformed into EU law in 1999 through the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
UK remained outside the system. This was done through a protocol to the Amsterdam 
Treaty which has since been carried through to subsequent treaties. Thus, the role of the 
UK in the development of policies in this area has been one of absence or, indeed, even an 
obstacle to be overcome. Even if the UK was not the only Member State concerned about 
the implications for state sovereignty, it is not clear that the development of the Schengen 
area within EU law would have taken place without UK opposition. The 1987 Single 
European Act’s new definition of the internal market as an area without controls on the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital could have provided the legal basis, for 
the purpose of achieving a border-control-free EU, to replace the 1985 Schengen 
Agreement. The development of the Schengen system outside EU law between 1985 and 
1999 was thus partly the result of the UK’s determination to retain border controls on 
persons coming from EU Member States to the UK.  
 
What the UK safeguarded has been the right to carry out border controls on the movement 
of persons from the EU27 (though, in reality, this is the EU26, as the Common Travel Area 
with Ireland means that there is no border control on persons between the UK and Ireland, 
an issue dealt with below).58 At the present time, the continuation of UK border checks on 
EU citizens is subject to the right of all EU citizens to enter and remain in the UK for three 
months without conditions (Directive 2004/38, Article 6).59 According to a BBC report, 
however, a Government spokesperson stated that 6,500 EU nationals had been refused 
entry at UK borders between 2010 and 2016.60 Since the Conservative Party came to power 
in 2010, the Independent noted (using government data) that there has been a fivefold 
increase in the detention of EU nationals in the UK; by January 2017, EU nationals 
accounted for 11.4% (3,699) of all immigration detainees.61 These figures indicate the 
extent to which UK authorities consider that EU nationals are not entitled to exercise their 
right to enter and stay in the UK for three months under Article 6 Directive 2004/38: the 
only grounds for exception involve individuals who are a future and serious threat to a 
fundamental interest of society on the grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health (this threshold also applies where authorities justify their decision on the ground 
that there is a re-entry ban which is compliant with the [high] threshold).62 
 
                                                 
58 B. Ryan, ‘The common travel area between Britain and Ireland’, The Modern Law Review 64.6, 2001, pp.  831-
854. 
59 Council of the European Union , Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the right of citiznes of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 
72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, OJ L 229/35, 
29.6.2004. See also Guild,E.,  Peers,S. and Tomkin,J., The EU citizenship directive: a commentary, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. 
60 ‘Reality Check: How many EU nationals have been refused entry to the UK?’, BBC,  22.04.2016  at: 
 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36101449. 
61See Home Office, National Statistics Detention, 01.12.2016  at:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-july-to-september-2016/detention and  
analysis at:  http://www.independent. co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-citizens-detention-centres-immigration-detained-
five-times-theresa-may-Brexit-hostile-environment-a7534231.html. 
62 Guild, Peers and Tomkin, EU Citizenship Directive, 2014 op. cit.  
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Assuming that there is no specific arrangement made covering these areas after Brexit, the 
situation following the UK’s departure from the EU will be as follows: 
 
 EU26 nationals seeking to enter the UK will need to fulfil the conditions of the 
immigration rules; they will no longer enjoy a right to enter against which the UK 
authorities are required to justify refusal; instead they will be required to justify the 
purpose of their entry, e.g., visit less than six months, work with a prior 
authorisation to work under British law, family reunification with a prior 
authorisation under British law. etc;63 
 
 British nationals seeking to enter the EU26 will need to fulfil the Schengen Border 
Code requirements (entry for three months out of every six), for longer stays the EU 
immigration acquis will apply, e.g., the Blue Card Directive, the Student and 
Researcher Directive, the Family Reunification Directive, etc. (see Section 2). 
 
What will this mean in reality? The first practice which will disappear is the entitlement of 
EU26 nationals to enter the UK with an identity document other than a passport. British 
immigration law only allows for the use of national ID documents for EEA and Swiss 
nationals based on its current membership of the EU and EEA64 so this is unlikely to 
continue in the absence of a specific agreement on this. Following Brexit, the UK authorities 
have stated that entry to the UK will only be permitted on presentation of a valid passport. 
EU citizens will no longer be able to travel to the UK using their ID cards.65 Secondly, EU26 
nationals will no longer be able to use the queue at UK ports of entry currently reserved for 
British and all other EEA (including Swiss) nationals, meaning longer waits.66 Thirdly, EU26 
nationals will have to justify their request to enter the UK and will be subject to a decision 
of an immigration officer as to whether they fulfil the conditions. The general provision of 
British immigration law that an immigration officer can refuse entry to a foreigner on 
general interest grounds will apply to EU26 nationals.67 Any EU26 nationals travelling with 
third-country national family members will have to ensure that, should the nationality of 
their family members be subject to a British mandatory visa requirement, these family 
members fulfil this requirement. The list of countries subject to a mandatory visa 
requirement is not the same for the UK as the Schengen states. Most importantly, nationals 
of non-EU Western Balkan states, who are subject to a visa-free regime within the 
Schengen area, are required to obtain British visas before travel to the UK.  
 
Visa reciprocity is an important EU priority. This means that, in principle, states which 
require visas of EU citizens should be treated the same way by the EU, so their citizens 
should be subject to mandatory Schengen visa requirements. Visa reciprocity has strained 
EU-US relations because of the US’s refusal to lift mandatory visa requirements for 
nationals of some EU Member States.68 It cannot be taken for granted that visa reciprocity 
                                                 
63 Clayton, G., Textbook on immigration and asylum law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.  
64 See Home Office Rules at: https://www.gov.uk/uk-border-control/before-you-leave-for-the-uk. 
65 ‘Post-Brexit immigration: 10 key points from the Home Office document’, The Guardian, 05.09.2017 at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ng-interactive/2017/sep/05/post-brexit-immigration-10-key-points-from-
the-home-office-document 
66 ‘Will Brexit mean longer queues at passport control?, The Telegraph, 20.02.2017 at:  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/news/Brexit-and-budget-cuts-could-mean-longer-passport-queues-airports-
warn/. 
67 See immigration rules on leave to enter or stay in the UK at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-
rules/immigration-rules-part-1-leave-to-enter-or-stay-in-the-uk#pt1stay and general grounds for refusal at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/607625/GGFR-Section-3-v28.pdf. 
68 Stefan, M., CEPS, The Transatlantic Dispute over Visas: The need for EU action in the face of US non-reciprocity, 
moving targets and the harvesting of EU citizens’ data, Brussels 2017  at:  
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can be guaranteed following Brexit. The UK’s approach to visas for Western Balkan 
nationals, for instance, could be extended to EU Western Balkan states in order to diminish 
irregular migration from those states to the UK. 
 
For British citizens seeking to enter EU or EEA (including Switzerland) states, the situation 
will vary across states. It will be a matter of negotiation whether Ireland will give privileged 
access to British citizens seeking to enter and reside in the country. All the EU and EEA 
states (including Switzerland) participating in the Schengen acquis (which means all of 
them except Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania) comply with the Schengen Borders 
Code.69 (While Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania are not formally part of the 
Schengen areas of border-control-free travel for persons yet, they voluntarily apply the 
Schengen acquis on border control regarding third-country nationals.) Assuming that 
Britain is not added to the Schengen visa black list, British citizens will not be required to 
obtain a visa before entry. If an EU electronic pre-entry requirement like the one proposed 
in ETIAS (currently under consideration by the legislator) is put into place, British citizens, 
like other third-country nationals, would be subject to it. British citizens will have to justify 
the reason for their entry into an EU Schengen state and then will have a total of 90 out of 
every 180 days to travel within the area. If they do not leave at the end of their permitted 
stay, they will become overstayers subject to the Return Directive (and expulsion).  
 
The British Government has expressed concerns that the British-Irish land border not 
become a so-called hard border.70 As Ireland also has an opt-out of the Schengen acquis 
(though not over the right of free movement of persons), there is no reason why Ireland 
(unless it joins the Schengen system) would have to apply the Schengen Borders Code to 
the border with the UK. Should Ireland join the Schengen system in full (including border 
controls), then it would have to introduce Schengen-compliant border checks with the UK. 
This would do no more than put Ireland in the same position as the EU 26 vis-à-vis border 
checks on people entering from the UK. 
 
3.1.2. Asylum 
The UK’s geographic position and the nature of asylum flows have meant that other 
Member States have had relatively greater responsibility for asylum seekers. In theory, the 
UK should be able to send asylum seekers who have entered the EU through other Member 
States to those states. The UK is entitled to opt in or out of any measure in the field of 
asylum. The UK chose to opt in to the first phase of the CEAS in 2004 and 2005. The core 
measures (as recast) are the Dublin system (including the EURODAC fingerprint data base, 
designed originally to assist in identifying asylum seekers and the state through which they 
entered), the reception conditions directive, the qualification directive, and the procedures 
directive.71 The UK was thus an important actor in the development of the first phase of 
the CEAS.  
 
However, when these core measures were renewed in the Second Phase of the CEAS in 
2011–2013, the UK opted out of all of them except the EURODAC and the Dublin III 
regulations.72 The UK’s involvement in EU asylum policies has thus become more marginal. 
Brexit without an agreement will mean the end of Dublin returns to the EU27, but these 
                                                                                                                                                            
 https://www.ceps.eu/publications/transatlantic-dispute-over-visas-need-eu-action-face-us-non-reciprocity-
moving-targets. 
69 Council of the European Union,  Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 
March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders 
Code) (codification), OJ L 77/1, 23.3.2016. 
70 See ‘The Hardest Border’, BBC, op. cit. 
71 See 2.1. of this report. 
72 Peers, Moreno-Lax, Garlick and Guild, EU Immigration and Asylum Law, 2015, op. cit.  
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amount to a drop in the (European) asylum bucket (the UK sent requests to take back 
under Dublin in respect to 1,513 asylum seekers). The UK received 38,785 first asylum 
applications in 2016 and 40,160 in 2015; its neighbour of a similar population size, France, 
received double those amounts (84,270 applications in 2016 and 76,165 in 2015).73  
 
Similarly, the UK will no longer participate in the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). 
While the UK is not formally part of Frontex (nor of the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency), it is currently invited to Management Board meetings. As the 
European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) is a continuation of Frontex, the UK does 
not participate in it.  
 
At the moment, the UK remains bound by its opt in to the First Phase of CEAS. This 
provides a floor of rights and procedures in the asylum system regarding reception 
conditions and qualification as a beneficiary of international protection (including as a 
refugee) and procedures (the right to an individual interview and appeal procedures, etc.). 
After Brexit is formally completed, British national implementing legislation for the First 
Phase of CEAS can be changed. The floor of rights which exists as a result of EU legislation 
will no longer apply.74 For asylum seekers in the UK, this will mean that national law can be 
changed so that standards of reception are diminished (greater detention powers may be 
possible) and more onerous procedural rules are put in place. This could have an impact on 
the EU determination of whether the UK is a safe third country for the return of asylum 
seekers. But it will probably not result in a substantial change to the rules for recognition as 
a refugee or person in need of international protection, as EU rules mirror the 1951 UN 
Refugee Convention and the ECHR, to which the UK is a party outside of its EU 
membership.75  
 
The EURODAC database is tied to the Dublin system of determining the state responsible 
for applicants for international protection. Since 2013 it has been amended for use by law 
enforcement officials in the Member States.76 After Brexit EURODAC will not be available for 
British law enforcement purposes. Because the primary purpose of the database is to 
determine which Member State is responsible under the Dublin rules for the care and 
determination of asylum applications, it is unlikely that the UK would be able to have 
access to the database if it is outside the Dublin system.  
 
At the moment, the EU Charter has been very important in the CJEU’s interpretation of the 
CEAS.77 The UK will no longer be bound by the EU Charter after Brexit. Assuming that there 
is no agreement on the applicability of CJEU judgments in the UK after Brexit, the matter 
will have to be resolved by the British constitution. Refugee rights and asylum are likely to 
be less well protected from a fundamental rights perspective after Brexit because of the 
loss of protection of the EU Charter and the lack of domestication of the rights and 
principles it contains. 
                                                 
73 See the 2016 EASO Annual Report  at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Annual-Report-2016.pdf. 
74 Clayton, Textbook on immigration and asylum law, 2016, op. cit.  
75 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28.7.1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, 
vol. 189, p. 137 at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html; Council of Europe, European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 
4.11.1950, ETS 5  at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html. 
76 Regulation (EU) 603/2013, op. cit.  
77 Peers, S. et al., eds., The EU Charter of fundamental rights: a commentary, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 
2014 and Ippolito, F., ‘Migration and Asylum Cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union: Putting the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to Test?’, European Journal of Migration and Law 17.1.2015, pp. 1-38. 
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3.1.3. Free movement of persons and immigration 
When the UK joined the EU it opted in to a fully established system of free movement of 
workers, self-employed and service providers and recipients (see below).  The UK opted out 
of policy and legislation in immigration matters, particularly in relation to third country 
nationals and therefore this study will not look into this area as it is not affected 
significantly by Brexit.  The only additional area would be free movement of persons though 
the Single European Act, accomplished by the abolition of border controls within the EU 
(which the UK rejected). The main changes to the system include: 
 
 The abolition of border controls in Member States on the free movement of persons 
(which the UK opposed) in the 1987 Single European Act. 
 The introduction of EU citizenship in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, which the UK 
participated in. 
 The incorporation of the Schengen acquis into EU treaties by the 1999 Amsterdam 
Treaty, for which the UK obtained and exercised an opt out. 
 The provision of the legal effect of the EU Charter by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, from 
which the UK obtained an opt out. 
As regards secondary legislation, the rules on free movement of EU citizens remained 
unchanged until the early 1990s. The UK participated in the negotiations of three directives 
providing for free movement of pensioners, students, and the economically inactive at that 
time. A major overhaul of the secondary legislation took place in 2004, resulting in the 
adoption of Directive 2004/38. This directive incorporated the right of free movement for 
pensioners, students and the economically inactive, created the status of permanent 
residence after a five-year qualifying stay in a host Member State, and enhanced protection 
against expulsion. Since then two secondary instruments have been adopted, one to 
provide further protection for workers and the other for remedies. The UK participated in 
the negotiations for all these measures. 
 
The status of EU27 nationals in the UK and British nationals in the EU27 remains a 
substantial issue in the negotiations. Both sides have given it a substantial priority 
(together with obtaining agreement on the British payment to the EU upon departure). At 
the present time, there is very substantial distance between the two negotiation positions. 
The Commission’s approach is to safeguard the rights of EU27 nationals in accordance with 
the citizens’ directive (2004/38) and the principle of equal treatment with British citizens. 
This would be reciprocal for British citizens in the EU 27. The reason for including the two 
approaches is that EU27 nationals in the UK enjoy more extensive rights in some fields 
than their British counterparts. This is particularly apparent in the area of family 
reunification, where EU27 nationals working in the UK have a right to family reunification 
whereas British nationals must meet a wide range of requirements, which include high 
income thresholds, the successful passing of language and integration tests (the first 
abroad, before arrival) by most third-country-national family members, and other 
restrictive requirements. This means that British citizens who have always lived in the UK 
and wish to exercise family reunification with their third-country-national family members 
face greater hurdles than EU27 citizens residing in the UK. This is the consequence of the 
application of EU law: more restrictive national rules cannot be applied to EU27 nationals, 
who must only comply with the conditions set out in the citizens’ directive (2004/38).  
 
For British citizens living in EU Member States except Denmark and Ireland, the situation is 
clearer: Directive 2003/86 on family reunification of third-country nationals will apply to 
them. This directive sets out the rules and obligations of third-country nationals resident in 
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an EU state regarding family reunification, including the class of family members for whom 
family reunification is permitted, the conditions which can be attached, and the rights these 
family members have after entry. If a British national marries or otherwise becomes a 
family member of an EU27 national, either EU rules will apply if the EU27 national resides 
in another EU Member State or national rules will apply if the EU27 national lives in his or 
her home state. Directive 2003/86 does not apply (as a result of opt outs obtained in 1999) 
to Denmark and Ireland, where British citizens must comply with national family 
reunification rules. 
 
The rules of Directive 2003/86 will apply for British citizens already living in an EU25 state 
with their third-country-national family members. In Denmark and Ireland, however, 
national law can be applied to them. As regards EEA states and Switzerland, which are not 
bound by Directive 2003/86, after Brexit national law will apply for family reunification for 
third-country-national family members of British citizens.  
 
To safeguard the rights of EU27 nationals after Brexit, the Commission has proposed the 
continuing jurisdiction of the CJEU in respect to EU27 nationals with rights under EU law. 
This complex issue is highly contested in the UK. The problem is substantial. A recent 
example of the difficulties in the protection of EU citizens’ rights is exemplified in Molina, R 
(On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWHC 
1730 (Admin). In this case, the British High Court held that even though an Italian national 
working in the UK was in a genuine relationship with a third-country national (the couple 
was even trying to get married), theirs was a relationship (and marriage) of convenience 
not protected by EU law (Directive 2004/38). As a result, the third-country-national partner 
could be expelled from the UK. The idea that a relationship can be genuine but still a 
marriage of convenience, and thus outside the scope of EU law, is a novel approach 
inconsistent with CJEU jurisprudence, which was extensively cited to the British court. 
 
The UK Government has made its own proposal on the future of EU citizens to the 
Commission. Irish nationals will be provided with free movement rights, in accordance with 
a pre-EU treaty between the two countries. The UK proposes that EU26 nationals be 
gradually incorporated under British Immigration Rules (which apply to all third-country 
nationals and which are quite restrictive). The key to the British offer is that EU citizens 
must apply for residence documents (not a requirement of EU law).78 Most (but perhaps not 
all) of the EU26 nationals who have acquired an EU right to permanent residence as a 
result of a period of five years of qualifying residence in the UK will be transferred to the 
British national long-term residence status, which grants indefinite leave to remain. EU26 
nationals already in the UK and acquiring rights towards the EU status of permanent 
residence may be entitled to continue acquiring those rights and apply for indefinite leave 
to remain. There will be a grace period of two years after Brexit so that EU nationals can 
file their applications. If they fail to do so, they will be subject to British immigration law, 
which means that they will probably be classified as overstayers, irregularly present in the 
UK, and thus liable to expulsion. 
 
The position of Irish nationals calls for some attention. According to the British offer, they 
will continue to be entitled to free movement and will be allowed to work (including self-
employment) and study in the UK under the same conditions as British citizens. This offer is 
justified as the application of the Ireland Acts of 1948 and 1949, adopted by Ireland and 
the UK, respectively. The Ireland Acts provide reciprocal rights to nationals of the two 
                                                 
78 EU citizens are not required to register in a host state, although a host state can require them to do so. Most 
Member States do not require registration. The acquisition of permanent residence occurs automatically. 
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countries regarding movement and residence. The application of the Ireland Acts in the 
Brexit context means that the official number of putative EU27 nationals living in the UK 
may be diminished as Irish nationals are a large group. But official statistics regarding 
EU27 nationals residing in the UK are rather murky. The prevalence of dual nationality 
among Irish-British nationals and many others, particularly for the generations born in the 
UK, makes it rather complex to arrive at accurate figures. Further, there is anecdotal 
evidence that since the Brexit referendum many British citizens have been checking their 
ancestry and following up on entitlements to citizenship or passports of other Member 
States arising therefrom.79 It would be worthwhile to check with EU27 authorities whether 
there are substantial numbers of British citizens seeking citizenship or confirmation thereof 
and whether their nationals are dual citizens with the UK. Access to dual citizenship will 
mean that British citizens of European heritage are more likely to be able to retain their EU 
citizenship than those from other backgrounds.  
 
With regards to ancillary issues such as social security rights (including pension 
contributions and benefits), recognition of diplomas, workers’ rights, taxation, etc., the key 
issue will be what legislation applies. If EU law continues to apply (a matter which is a 
subject of negotiation), then the situation is clear. But if EU nationals become subject 
exclusively to British law, then their situation changes dramatically. For example, the UK 
has a policy of freezing pensions (i.e., not applying annual upgrade assessments) for 
pensioners who live in a substantial number of foreign countries (although not in the 
EU27): the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on Frozen British Pensions states that this 
policy of freezing pensions covers 95% of British pensioners living in Commonwealth 
countries.80  
     
For British citizens who become third-country nationals in the EU27, the rules of social 
security rights are a little clearer. The main EU Regulation 883/2004 and its implementing 
legislation has been extended to lawfully resident third-country nationals. Although the 
scope of the regulation is limited to the EU, there have been indications that social security 
contributions made in a state before its accession to the EU also count for the purposes of 
aggregation and export. Whether the same would be true regarding a state which ceased to 
be a Member State is uncertain. 
 
Negotiations have not been helped by UK’s position on the necessity of (private) 
comprehensive sickness insurance for EU27 nationals living in the UK but not working or 
self-employed (which also applies to periods between work or self-employment): the UK 
Home Office claims that these periods of residence are not in accordance with EU law and 
thus do not count towards permanent residence and could be considered to be a break to 
continuity of residence.81 The problem, simply put, is that when an EU citizen (like a 
student) has recourse to the UK’s National Health Service, UK authorities may consider the 
individual to no longer be lawfully resident because the person should have comprehensive 
sickness insurance (and not rely on the universal system available to UK residents). The 
Commission has been examining the extent to which the same approach is taken by other 
Member States, but informal indications are that this is not the case.82 
                                                 
79 See How UK citizens can stay in Europe after Brexit at: https://qz.com/716113/Brexit-how-to-stay-in-europe/. 
80See http://frozenbritishpensions.org and https://www.connexionfrance.com/index.php/French-news/ Brexit/MPs-
to-debate-end-to-freezing-of-state-pensions-of-British-pensioners-abroad. 
81 Valcke, A., EU Rights Clinic, A., Case studies – access to social and health services for mobile EU citizens, 2015 
at:https://www.academia.edu/15008125/Case_studies_Access_to_Social_and_Health_Services_for_Mobile_EU_Ci
tizens/ and Vargas-Silva, C.,  ‘EU Migration to and from the UK After Brexit’, Intereconomics 51.5, 2016, pp. 251-
255. 
82 Meduna, M. Commission Office DG Justice, London, UK Immigration Law Practitioners Association Conference, 
04.10.2017.  
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3.2. Important areas and challenges for future cooperation 
 
For the moment, there is no clarity on how the negotiations will proceed. One of the central 
unresolved questions is the so-called ‘cut-off date’: that is, when do EU27 nationals cease 
to be eligible to rely on their EU rights while in the UK? According to the Commission’s 
offer, this should be the date of the UK’s effective departure. The British offer does not 
clarify what date should apply, leaving that open for negotiation. This is particularly 
important for British and EU26 nationals (excluding Ireland, see above) who have moved or 
are moving to the EU26 or the UK since the British referendum. At the moment, the earliest 
date which seems to be under discussion is when the UK triggered Article 50 (29 March 
2017). The chosen date will have consequences regarding the retroactive effect of the law, 
but how this will be dealt with remains to be negotiated. The Treaty on the European Union 
(TEU) does not specify further than Article 50 what happens in the event of a Member State 
departing. The principles of law which may apply remain to be clarified. This may be the job 
eventually of the CJEU. 
 
 After Brexit, movement between the UK and the EU26 (assuming the situation with Ireland 
remains on the footing of the Ireland Acts) will become much more complicated. If there is 
no agreement to the contrary, British nationals will become third-country nationals for the 
purposes of EU law. This means that EU measures on migration will apply to them. These 
measures will apply to students and researchers, family reunification with third-country 
family members already in the EU26, long-term residence status after five years of 
residence in the host EU Member State fulfilling the conditions of the directive; highly 
skilled employment under the Blue Card Directive and Intra-Company Transfers under that 
directive, and seasonal workers under the directive of that name. The Return Directive will 
apply to British citizens in the EU26 who no longer comply with the conditions of their 
admission and residence. The EU26 are obliged to apply EU law in this field. Once the EU 
exercises competence in an area it acquires exclusive competence over the matter – so 
Member States are not entitled to adopt national laws or practices inconsistent with EU 
provisions. Unless one of the third-country-national directives permits a derogation under 
national law (such as the maintenance of national highly skilled migrant schemes in the 
Blue Card Directive), no exception can be made for British nationals. 
 
The situation will be equally clear for EU26 nationals in the UK. If they have not started to 
acquire rights before the cut-off date, then they will have to comply with British 
Immigration Rules, which are substantially more restrictive than EU immigration measures. 
Family reunification is harder, labour migration is difficult and subject to a cap, intra-
company transfers require businesses to be registered and must fulfil high income 
thresholds, and students need to obtain a specific residence status and need to evidence 
substantial funds to support themselves through their studies. There is no guarantee that 
the dramatically lower ‘home-student’ fees (GBP 9,250 maximum for English universities) 
will continue to apply to EU26 students, in which case the higher ‘overseas’ student fees 
will apply (ranging from GBP 10,000 to GBP 35,000 depending on the course). UK 
universities have stated that EU27 students who have commenced their studies before 
Brexit will benefit from home student fees. 
 
Differential treatment of Irish nationals and EU26 nationals may be problematic from the 
EU side, as the principle of equality of EU citizens will be questioned. As exemplified in the 
EU visa reciprocity debate, one high priority for the EU is the equal treatment of EU citizens 
by third-country authorities. When this concerns actions within the EU’s scope, this is even 
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an obligation in EU law. Historical relationships between some Member States and third 
countries were negotiated at the time of the EEC Treaties or on accession to preserve some 
benefits. If a similar situation is to continue after Brexit for Irish nationals, this would need 
to be part of the deal.  
 
The hardening of EU-UK border controls is likely to be an inevitable consequence of Brexit. 
The legal framework for border controls both in the UK and the EU requires full border 
checks on third-country nationals, giving substantial powers to border guards to refuse 
entry since third-country nationals have no inherent right to enter the EU or the UK. In 
both cases, the burden of substantiating the reason for entry rests on the individual.  
 
The departure of the UK from the CEAS is unlikely to have significant consequences for the 
EU27, but it may result in changes to the UK’s asylum system that do not benefit refugees. 
But as the UK has only participated in a very limited number of the AFSJ’s immigration 
measures, its departure will not make a substantial difference.83 
 
The Brexit negotiations have started discussing the status of EU/UK citizens. The issue is a 
top priority for both sides. However, the starting point for the two sides is extremely far 
apart. The UK offer seeks to interiorise EU26 nationals in the UK, applying to them current 
UK immigration rules with no promises about any protection from subsequent changes to 
those rules. The EU Commission seeks to extend indefinitely the current EU rules on free 
movement of persons to EU27 nationals living in the UK as long as they have started to 
acquire rights by Brexit day. For British citizens, the Commission appears to be content to 
seek a protection of their residence status in the current host Member State without further 
EU27 mobility rights. 
 
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the current debate (autumn 2017) is the sense on 
both sides that it is unclear whether a deal will be struck. The issue of the treatment of 
EU/UK citizens seems to be creating great intransigence. 
3.3. Conclusions and recommendations 
Many problems will likely arise if no deal on the status of EU and British citizens after Brexit 
is struck. First, for EU27 citizens in the UK, Irish nationals are likely to get a very different 
deal from the EU26, creating discrimination in treatment by a third country (as the UK will 
then be). This will raise the issue of reciprocity. EU26 nationals are likely to be absorbed 
over a two-year period in the UK's existing immigration rules. British citizens living in or 
seeking to go to the EU27 countries will become third-country nationals and will have to 
fulfil the requirements of EU measures for third-country nationals. In areas which have not 
yet been fully harmonised, British citizens will be subject to the national law of Member 
States.  
 
 
 
                                                 
83 These include Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 of 13 June 2002 laying 
down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals, OJ L 157, 15.6.2002; Council of the 
European Union, Council Decision of 5 October 2006 on the establishment of a mutual information mechanism 
concerning Member States’ measures in the areas of asylum and immigration, OJ L 283, 14.10.2006; Council of 
the European Union , Council Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 of 29 May 1995 laying down a uniform format for visas, 
OJ L 164, 14.7.1995; and Council of the European Union , Council Regulation (EC) No 333/2002 of 18 February 
2002 on a uniform format for forms for affixing the visa issued by Member States to persons holding travel 
documents not recognised by the Member State drawing up the form, OJ L 53/4, 23.2.2002.  
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4. JUDICIAL COOPERATION 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters will take much longer and be 
more expensive if there is no deal between after Brexit. 
 Judicial cooperation in criminal matters is a key element in combating serious and 
organised crime and terrorism, so there is a mutual interest in seeking agreement. 
 The UK’s position on the CJEU and the rights contained in the EU Charter is a serious 
impediment to future agreements on judicial cooperation. 
 A failure to agree on transitional and future arrangements in the field of 
international family law risks leaving a serious gap in the legal framework for 
proceedings involving children, which could affect EU citizens with connections to 
the UK. 
 
 
This chapter will highlight some of the issues the EU27 will face when it comes to continued 
judicial cooperation with the UK after Brexit. The scale of the challenges means that a 
detailed assessment across all areas is not possible within the scope of this study and 
particular pieces of legislation have been highlighted because of the scale of their impact. 
Brexit brings up two fundamental questions in relation to judicial cooperation for the EU. 
Firstly, what is the practical impact of losing enhanced cooperation with the UK? Secondly, 
what future vision does the EU have for judicial cooperation and how can future 
arrangements with the UK support it? 
 
4.1. Role of the UK in the development of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters 
 
The UK has had a chequered relationship with EU law when it comes to developing judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. While cooperation with the EU in the field of criminal law is 
often politically controversial, the UK has given significant political and practical support to 
the development of EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters.84 Indeed, the 1998 Cardiff 
European Council, held under the UK Presidency, gave rise to the principle of ‘mutual 
recognition’ as a cornerstone of EU judicial cooperation (as opposed to harmonisation of 
criminal law).85 This principle allowed the UK to protect the space of the common law within 
the rapidly developing field of EU criminal law; it has also provided the basis for greatly 
enhanced cooperation as compared to previous models for mutual legal assistance. 
 
                                                 
84 British officials have had significant roles in building the AFSJ from the establishment of the Task Force for 
Justice and Home Affairs (headed by Adrian Fortescue and Jonathan Faull as Director General of the then DG JHA) 
to UK leadership in Eurojust by Mike Kennedy from its inception and, more recently, with Rob Wainwright as 
Director of Europol. 
85 See Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Cardiff European Council, 15-16.6.1998, Conclusion 
39, and Jimeno-Bulnes,M., ‘Brexit and the Future of European Criminal Law – A Spanish Perspective’, Criminal Law 
Forum, 28.05.2017, pp. 325-347, at p. 335. 
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Along with Denmark and Ireland, the UK has the option to opt in or out of Lisbon Treaty 
Title V measures (Protocol 36). In 2013 the UK Government notified the Council of 
Ministers that it was going to exercise the block opt-out from the pre-Lisbon police and 
criminal justice measures. It indicated that it would seek to re-join thirty-five of those same 
measures, which it did (from 1 December 2014) to ensure their seamless application. By 
opting in to those measures, the UK accepted that the enforcement powers of the European 
Commission and full CJEU jurisdiction would apply to those measures from that date. The 
then Home Secretary Theresa May, now Prime Minister, said in November 2014 that the 
measures the UK opted into were ‘vital’ in order to ‘stop foreign criminals from coming to 
Britain, deal with European fighters coming back from Syria, stop British criminals evading 
justice abroad, prevent foreign criminals evading justice by hiding here, and get foreign 
criminals out of our prisons’.86 May later added that failing to re-join those 35 measures 
‘would risk harmful individuals walking free and escaping justice, and would seriously harm 
the capability of our law enforcement agencies to keep the public safe’.87   
 
The UK has had the opportunity to decide about opting in or out of post-Lisbon measures. 
While it has not chosen to opt in across the board, it has done so for certain significant 
instruments.88 Most recently, on 20 July 2017, the UK Government announced that it would 
opt in to the new regulation on mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders.89 
Although the previous UK Government decided to opt out of the 2014 Directive on this 
issue, the UK had opted in to earlier pre-Lisbon Framework Decisions on asset freezing in 
December 2014.90 Despite the relatively recent transposition of these instruments in the 
UK, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) gave evidence about the scale of cooperation 
the UK is engaged in on asset freezing: 
 
[C]urrently we have 69 requests for restraint and we have £170 million frozen in the UK. 
They are assets that we have been asked to freeze by other European countries. It also 
means that we can ask other European countries to do that, and we have … It is cheaper, 
quicker and more effective. The other slight advantage to it is that in cases where we are 
recovering more than £10,000 it is mandated that you split the proceeds that are recovered 
50/50—so there is a slight financial incentive as well.91 
 
The contradictory approach the UK has taken since 2014 to its decisions to opt in and 
transpose the different instruments on freezing and confiscation orders seems to indicate 
that there is no clear political line in the UK on more recent mutual recognition instruments.  
The UK Government’s recent decision to opt in to the new regulation over a year after the 
Brexit referendum could be interpreted as a sign that the UK would like to continue to 
cooperate with the EU in this area. But it is also an indication of the lack of coherence in UK 
policy on Brexit in general and on the AFSJ in particular. The scale of cooperation that has 
built up over the last three years in this area would suggest there is a clear operational 
interest for the EU27 in continued enhanced cooperation with the UK. It remains to be seen 
                                                 
86 Theresa May, ‘Fight Europe by all means, but not over this Arrest Warrant’, The Daily Telegraph, 09.11.2014 at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/11216589/Theresa-May-Fight-Europe-by-all-means-but-
not-over-this-Arrest-Warrant.html.   
87House of Commons, Hansard Debates, 10.11.2014, columns 1224, 1228, 1229 at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm141110/debtext/141110-0002.htm. 
88 The UK opted in to the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, which came into force on 22 May 
2017. See Directive 2014/41/EU, op. cit.  
89 See Chapter 2.2 above. 
90 See Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution 
in the European Union of orders freezing property or evidence, OJ L 196, 2.8.2003; and Council of the European 
Union, Council Framework Decision 2006/783, op. cit.  
91 House of Lords, Corrected oral evidence: Brexit: future EU-UK security and police co-operation, 02.11.2016, 
Q58 at: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-home-affairs-subcommittee/Evidence-Brexit-
Policing.pdf. 
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if this is a practical possibility given the UK Government’s current position to reject the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU and the application of the EU Charter’s rights and principles.92 
 
If one takes the example of the EAW, the UK receives a large number of requests from the 
EU27 every year. The UK surrenders around 1,000 people on EAWs every year and receives 
around 10% of that number in surrenders from other EU Member States. Some EU27 
countries, like Poland (half of whose EAW requests are executed in the UK), will be 
particularly affected by a British withdrawal from the EAW system.93 Failing to reach a 
similar arrangement with the UK after Brexit will result in a significant cost increase to 
EU27 Member States in extradition requests to and from the UK, with potentially significant 
delays in bringing suspects to justice.94 
 
Table 1. EAW Requests to and from the UK.  
Wanted from the UK95 
 
Part 1 EAWs - Calendar Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Requests 4,369 6,512 6,290 5,522 13,460 12,613 48,766 
Arrests 1,307 1,332 1,331 1,775 1,519 2,041 9,305 
Surrenders 1,038 1,079 1,025 1,126 1,097 1,149 6,514 
 
Wanted by the UK96 
 
Part 3 EAWs - Calendar Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Requests 252 226 271 219 228 228 1,424 
Arrests 141 151 148 170 156 150 916 
Surrenders 133 136 136 127 145 123 800 
 
The UK has been an active member of Eurojust from the start, with the Presidents of the 
College being British from its inception until 2012. The UK’s practical role within Eurojust 
has not diminished since then. According to the 2016 annual report, the UK received 262 
requests for assistance through Eurojust, the second highest number of any Member State, 
while it made 111 requests.97 The UK has also been a very active participant in Joint 
Investigation Teams (JITs). From 2009 to 2013, Eurojust provided over €1.8 million in 
funding for JITs involving British participation (this figure is now estimated to be around 
                                                 
92 The UK Government rejects the protection of rights and principles that go beyond the European Convention on 
Human Rights, such as the right to protection of personal data. Rights enshrined in the ECHR will remain 
applicable.  
93 Swiatlowski, A. and Nita-Swiatlowska, B., ‘Brexit and the Future of European Criminal Law – A Polish 
Perspective’, Criminal Law Forum 28:2, 2017, pp. 319-324. 
94 It is impossible to compare figures with pre-2003 Extradition Act extraditions to and from the UK to the EU27, in 
particular because many of the most affected Member States, such as Poland, were not yet members of the EU.  
95 National Crime Agency, Wanted from the UK: European Arrest Warrant Statistics 2008 – May 2016 (Calendar 
Year, 9.5.2016 at: 
 http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/european-arrest-warrant-statistics/wanted-from-the-uk-
european-arrest-warrant-statistics/691-wanted-from-the-uk-european-arrest-warrant-statistics-2009-may-2016-
calendar-year. 
96 National Crime Agency, Wanted by the UK: European Arrest Warrant statistics 2009 – May 2016 (Calendar Year) 
at:http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/european-arrest-warrant-statistics/wanted-by-the-uk-
european-arrest-warrant-statistics.  
97 See graphs in Eurojust Annual Report (2016), op. cit., p. 11.  
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€2.5 million).98 The UK was the largest recipient of funding in 2016 for the establishment of 
JITs.99 It is also an active participant in the European Judicial Network.100 
 
The scale of judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the UK and the EU27 means 
that some EU27 countries may experience significant impacts on both resources and 
security if suitable arrangements are not made going forward. There will also be ongoing 
operations involving the UK on Brexit day, so transitional arrangements will need to be built 
into the Withdrawal Agreement to ensure that those proceedings are not compromised 
while ensuring both the protection of the fundamental rights of those concerned and the 
integrity of judicial proceedings concerning serious and organised crime. 
4.2. Important areas and challenges for future cooperation in 
criminal matters 
 
There are many challenges for future judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but there is a 
clear mutual interest in continuing to cooperate with the UK in order to combat serious and 
organised crime and terrorism and to ensure that Brexit does not compromise European 
security. 
 
It will not be possible to draw a clean line over cross-border cooperation on Brexit day.  
There will be pending EAWs and other requests as well as ongoing JITs. If these transitional 
issues are to be handled effectively, a legal basis for transitional cooperation will be 
needed; such a legal basis should be included in the Withdrawal Agreement to ensure that 
pending and ongoing actions are not immediately compromised. In the July 2017 position 
paper ‘Essential Principles on Ongoing Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’, 
the European Commission stated that the Withdrawal Agreement should allow for the 
orderly completion of ongoing procedures in a number of instruments in the area of police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.101 The Withdrawal Agreement would need to 
establish the procedural stage that has been reached in order for the procedure to continue 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of EU law applicable on withdrawal date; the EU 
position paper states that all applicable procedural rights enshrined in EU law should 
continue to apply.102 This will require a detailed analysis of the implications, including the 
potential impact to individuals subject to judicial proceedings and their rights, for cutting 
off cooperation at a particular stage. The UK Government has not yet indicated how it 
envisages this transition will work in practice. It has issued a position paper on ongoing 
judicial and administrative procedures involving the UK, but this is only relevant for cases 
pending before the CJEU (and the UK’s restrictive approach on CJEU jurisdiction is likely to 
make it difficult to agree effective transitional arrangements that do not seek to dilute the 
role of the CJEU). The Withdrawal Agreement itself may be challenged before the CJEU, so 
it is crucial that any agreement includes adequate checks and balances to ensure that the 
protection of individual rights enshrined in the EU Charter is real and effective throughout 
the withdrawal process.  
 
                                                 
98 The Anti Trafficking Monitoring Group, Brexit and the UK’s fight against modern slavery, July 2017 at: 
https://www.antislavery.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/ATMG-Brexit-paper.pdf. 
99 See Eurojust, Annual Report, 2016, op. cit.  
100 See EJN, Evaluation report on the sixth round of mutual evaluations,   2014 op. cit.  
101  European Commission, Position paper on ongoing police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
13.7.2017 at: 
 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/position-paper-ongoing-police-and-judicial-%20cooperation-
criminal-matters_en.  
102 Ibid. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 34 
There have been some suggestions that the EU should seek a treaty-based mutual 
assistance system based on existing EU mutual recognition instruments. But given the 
length of time that may be required to put new agreements in place, there may also be a 
need for other transitional arrangements to avoid the risk of being unable to engage with 
the UK effectively on serious and organised crime and terrorism in the period immediately 
after Brexit day.103 While the duration and scope of such transitional arrangements will be a 
matter for negotiation, they could, for example, include an extended application of relevant 
judicial cooperation measures with the UK for a specified amount of time. This, however, 
would likely depend on the UK agreeing to be bound by CJEU jurisdiction and the 
application of the EU Charter with respect to the implementation of those instruments for 
the duration of the transitional arrangements. As an interim measure, EU27 Member States 
who most actively engage with the UK in this sphere may well want to assess their 
domestic legislation in order to set up bilateral arrangements with the UK to ensure that 
cooperation can be continued even in the absence of EU-level agreements on Brexit day. 
4.2.1. Mutual recognition 
In many areas, cooperation with the UK could fall back onto Council of Europe treaties in 
the field of criminal justice cooperation, including the 1957 European Convention on 
Extradition (ECE) and the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters. But these treaties, dating back over sixty years, do not have the same level of 
detail or effectiveness as EU arrangements which have revolutionised the field over the 
past twenty years. In some cases, EU Member States, including the UK, have not signed or 
ratified the relevant conventions.104 In any event, it is likely that domestic laws will have 
moved on significantly. Stepping back to international legal arrangements, whether 
bilateral or multilateral, is likely to require a significant amount of domestic legislative 
amendment to ensure that the EU27, whether individually or collectively, are able to 
continue cooperating with the UK on a clear legal basis.  
 
Using the example of the EAW which has no provision for third countries, the EU could 
come to a similar separate agreement with the UK as a third country. This is not 
necessarily an easy or quick option. The EU concluded an agreement for surrender of 
persons similar to the EAW with Norway and Iceland: the agreement took thirteen years to 
negotiate and, more than three years after its conclusion, it has still not yet entered into 
force.105 Moreover, this agreement is not as comprehensive as the EAW, as it does not 
allow for the surrender of own nationals. Many EU Member States are unable to extradite 
their own nationals outside the EU. This is not a problem for extradition from the UK, which 
does not have such a bar, but it may mean that some Member States will be unable to 
surrender criminals who are own nationals for prosecution in the UK in the future.106 This 
may have cost and security implications for these Member States if they are obliged to 
                                                 
103 Bock, S., ‘Brexit and the Future of European Criminal Law – the German Perspective’, Criminal Law Forum, 
28:2, 2017, pp. 311-318, at p. 313. 
104 The Council of Europe Convention on the Validity of Criminal Judgments has not been ratified by more than half 
of EU Member States, including the UK. 
105 In 2001, the Council authorised the Presidency to open negotiations with Iceland and Norway with a view to 
extending to those countries the parts of the EU Extradition Convention of 27 September 1996 which were not 
related to the Schengen Agreement. This authority was expanded in 2002, following the adoption by the EU 
Member States of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant. The signing of the 
Agreement was authorised by the Council Decision 2006/697/EC on 27 June 2006, but the Agreement was not 
concluded by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It was finally agreed in 2014 2014/835/EU: Council 
Decision of 27 November 2014 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic 
of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the surrender procedure between the Member States of the European 
Union and Iceland and Norway. As at July 2017 the agreement had not entered into force in the relevant third 
countries at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/16/1606.htm#_idTextAnchor023  
106 Around 22 EU Member States will be affected by this rule, including Germany; see Bock, Brexit and the Future 
of European Criminal Law – the German Perspective, 2017, op. cit.  
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either prosecute themselves (where possible) or release individuals suspected of serious 
crimes.  
  
In her evidence to the House of Lords Inquiry, the UK’s Director of Public Prosecution 
highlighted the value of the EAW: 
 
The EAW came in because we were concerned about delays … when we looked at casework, 
either outside the EU or prior to the EAW, we were talking months and years rather than the 
days and weeks we currently have. It is much quicker and more effective. When we compare 
our data, it is three times faster to use an EAW and four times less expensive ….107 
 
The impact on the speed and cost effectiveness of cross-border surrenders following Brexit 
will be felt not only by the UK but any country wishing to extradite to or from the UK.108  
Existing domestic legislation in Member States and the UK may also require amendment to 
rely on the ECE or bilateral treaties with the UK.109 It may be in the interests of the EU27 to 
seek an agreement similar to the one put in place with Norway and Iceland. Given the time 
pressures, steps should be taken quickly to explore this option in tandem with Brexit 
negotiations. While there is no precedent for drafting an agreement with a country that will 
become a third country upon withdrawal from the EU, there is no legal barrier110 in principle 
to this approach if both the EU and the UK have the political will to continue cooperating in 
this way after Brexit. 
 
While the EAW was a flagship mutual recognition instrument, there have been many more 
such instruments since it began, some of which the UK has opted into. A fundamental 
question for the EU27 around future agreements with the UK will be whether it is in the 
EU’s interests to continue with the status quo situation where the UK can pick and choose 
which elements of the criminal justice acquis it opts into or if the EU should push for ‘all or 
nothing’. While it may be politically difficult for the UK to sign up to the full criminal justice 
acquis precisely at a time when it is leaving the EU to ‘take back control’, the way the EU 
deals with the UK as a third country in this field may have implications for its dealings with 
other third countries in the future. From the perspective of the EU, as opposed to the 
perspective of individual Member States, decisions on the future of the UK’s relationship 
with the EU criminal justice acquis need to take into account broader considerations than 
immediate practical and political expediency. 
 
4.2.2. Judicial cooperation bodies 
While the EJN does not include the possibility of non-EU members, it does engage with 
other international networks.111 It is also housed within Eurojust: from a practical 
perspective, therefore, UK involvement with Eurojust will be a priority.112 The UK will 
                                                 
107 House of Lords, Corrected oral evidence: Brexit: future EU-UK security and police co-operation, 2.11.2016, op. 
cit., Q65.  
108 Around 1000 requests a year to the UK from EU Member States (ibid, Q68).  
109 If the EU27 no longer have the domestic legislation needed to rely on the 1957 European Convention on 
Extradition, they will need to either make amendments to reinstate the ECE in their domestic law or reach bilateral 
agreements with the UK, either on an ad hoc or formal basis in order to be able to extradite to or from the UK in 
the absence of an EU-wide agreement. There does not appear to have been work done to assess the scale of this 
issue or to address the problem domestically in the EU27 Member States. 
110 The Treaties did not envisage this situation and therefore, while TFEU Article 218 provides for agreements 
negotiated with third countries and international organisations, there is no provision for existing EU Member 
States in the process of becoming third countries, but neither is there a prohibition on such negotiations with an 
agreement presumably being concluded at the point they become a third country. 
111 Eurojust, Cooperation with third countries and judicial networks at: https://www.ejnforum.eu/cp/network-atlas.  
112 Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2008/976/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the European Judicial 
Network, OJ L 348/130, 24.12.2008. 
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effectively become a third country under the Eurojust Decision after Brexit.113 Article 26a 
allows Eurojust to enter into ‘cooperative relations’ with third countries and organisations 
which include the sharing of personal data and the secondment of liaison officers and 
liaison magistrates to Eurojust.114 Yet the sharing of personal data with a third country 
requires either it being subject to the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (28 January 1981) or an 
assessment confirming that the country ensures an adequate level of data protection. As 
the UK is subject to that Convention,115 there should be no obvious impediment to a 
cooperation agreement being made with the UK.116 
 
For Eurojust to conclude a third-country cooperation agreement, it must first consult with 
the Joint Supervisory Body regarding the issue of data protection and then get a qualified 
majority approval from the Council.117 A certain degree of cooperation (receiving 
information from a third country, including personal data, and sharing information with the 
third country, excluding personal data) is possible even prior to an agreement if it is 
necessary for the legitimate performance of Eurojust’s tasks.118 Eurojust is required to 
inform the Council of any plans for entering into such negotiations, and the Council may 
draw any conclusions it deems appropriate.119 Given the high level of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation through Eurojust and JITs between the UK and the EU27, such an 
agreement with the UK after Brexit would seem desirable for all concerned.120 At the time 
of writing, Eurojust has not publicly notified the Council of any plans to enter into 
negotiations with the UK regarding its post-Brexit relationship. Previous agreements with 
third countries have taken between five to seven years to complete.121 That is not 
necessarily an indication of how long it would take to reach an agreement with the UK, a 
former member of Eurojust. Such an agreement after Brexit could be agreed more quickly 
or it may take longer, depending on the politics that develop around the Brexit 
negotiations. As serious issues of security and the fight against terrorism and organised 
crime are at stake, it would seem prudent that Eurojust explore the possibility and scope of 
such negotiations as a matter of urgency. 
 
4.3. Role of the UK in the development of judicial cooperation in 
civil matters 
 
Judicial cooperation in civil matters predates the UK’s accession to the EEC, most notably 
with the agreement of the 1968 Brussels Convention. Since it joined the EU, the UK has 
been actively involved in the development of legislation in this area. In March 2017 the 
House of Lords EU Justice Sub-Committee’s report ‘Brexit: justice for families, individuals 
                                                 
113 Council of the European Union , Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the Strengthening of 
Eurojust and amending Council Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight 
against serious crime, OJ L 138/14, 4.6.2009.  
114Article 26a can be found at: http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/Partners/Documents/article-26a-EJD-EN.pdf.  
115See: https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/108/signatures?p_auth=xm3iO3cj. 
The territorial application of the Convention is extended to the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey, but not to British 
Overseas Territories, which include Gibraltar. 
116 Currently Eurojust has cooperation agreements with 9 third countries and hosts liaison magistrates from the 
United States, Norway and Switzerland; see: http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/Partners/Pages/third-
states.aspx.  
117 Eurojust Decision, Article 26a (2). 
118 Ibid. Article 26a (5), 26a (6). 
119 Ibid. Article 26a (2). 
120 See Bock, Brexit and the Future of European Criminal Law – the German Perspective, 2017, op. cit.  
121 On the reasons for delay in reaching an agreement with Switzerland, see Alison Saunders’s testimony in House 
of Lords, Corrected oral evidence: Brexit: future EU-UK security and police co-operation, 02.11.2016, op. cit., Q 
61-62.  
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and businesses?’ acknowledged and welcomed ‘the UK’s influence over the content of these 
three EU Regulations which are crucial to judicial cooperation in civil matters and reflect the 
UK’s influence and British legal culture’, urging ‘the Government to keep as close to these 
rules as possible when negotiating their post-Brexit application’.122 
 
Judicial cooperation in civil matters has significant implications for the right to family life123 
and the rights of the child124 as well as access to justice125 and effective remedies.126 
Judicial cooperation in civil matters has a long history in the EU. The then-six Member 
States engaged themselves in the original 1957 Treaty of Rome to ‘enter into negotiations 
with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals … the simplification 
of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts 
or tribunals and of arbitration awards’.127 
  
This chapter will focus on three principal regulations covering judicial cooperation in civil 
matters in the AFSJ that will be acutely affected by Brexit because of the significant impact 
the loss of these instruments will have on individuals and their cross-border arrangements 
post-Brexit: 
 
 Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) – known as the Brussels I 
Regulation recast (BIR). 
 Regulation 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility – known as 
the Brussels IIa Regulation128 (BIIa) 
 Regulation 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of 
decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance – known as the 
Maintenance Regulation (MR). 
 
These regulations are the result of negotiations and legal developments over time, 
reflecting the need for certainty in cross-border legal disputes in order to support the free 
movement of goods, services and people. BIIa is currently the subject of renegotiation.129 
 
Transborder family issues are not limited to multi-national families. In a Europe with a 
mobile work-force, even a family with parents from the same country can face international 
family law issues when, for example, one parent takes up work in another country, starts a 
                                                 
122 House of Lords, ‘Brexit: justice for families, individuals, and businesses?’, HL Paper 134, 20.3.2017, para. 23 
at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/134/134.pdf 
123 ECHR, Article 8; CFR, Article 7. 
124 Article 24 of the EU CFR provides detailed provisions on the rights of the child: 
 1.   Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They 
may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern 
them in accordance with their age and maturity; 
 2.   In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the 
child's best interests must be a primary consideration; 
 3.   Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct 
contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests. 
125 ECHR, Article 6 ; CFR, Article 47. 
126 ECHR, Article 15 ; CFR, Article 47. 
127 Treaty of Rome (1957), Article 220.  
128 Also known as Brussels II bis.  
129 According to the Commission Factsheet (30.6.2016) at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-
2359_en.htm) on the proposal: The main objectives of the changes are to further develop cross-border justice 
proceedings which requires mutual trust between EU countries’ judicial systems. It will be possible by removing 
the remaining obstacles to the free movement of judicial decisions with more mutual recognition and to better 
protect the best interests of the child by simplifying the procedures and enhancing their efficiency. The new rules 
will bring legal certainty, reduce costs and, most importantly, limit the length of proceedings in parental child 
abduction cases, for the benefit of both children and their parents. 
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new family in a different country, or if the family is based outside their home country but 
one parent wants to go home following a family breakup. For the best interests of the child, 
it is necessary that challenges like international parental child abduction or non-payment of 
child maintenance across borders are effectively addressed. Lengthy and complex court 
proceedings in multiple jurisdictions are not accessible for many families with limited 
resources. BIIa and MR offer a simplified framework for addressing these issues quickly and 
effectively, making a huge difference to the lives of children and their parents across the 
EU. Because of the very significant impact that Brexit could have on the lives and 
fundamental rights of people across the EU with family ties to the UK, including some of the 
most vulnerable children, the family law aspect of judicial cooperation in civil matters will 
be the main focus of this section. While fundamental rights concerns may be the engine 
driving closer cooperation, the UK’s current position towards the CJEU and the rights and 
principles contained in the EU Charter may be a significant obstacle to future agreement 
post-Brexit.130 
4.3.1. Civil and commercial law 
The international legal services industry is very important for the UK, in particular 
London.131 The House of Lords noted in its March 2017 report: ‘The evidence suggests that 
jurisdictions in other EU Member States, and arbitrators in the UK, stand to gain from the 
current uncertainty over the post-Brexit application of the BIR, as may other areas of 
dispute resolution’.132  
    
While this may be viewed as an opportunity for EU legal services,133 barrister Oliver Jones 
noted in the House of Lords Inquiry that while ‘we think very much of big corporates, large 
commercial claims’, the BIR ‘applies equally to very small claims, individual claims and 
small company claims … which could be for a very small amount of money’. Anything that 
undermined the BIR’s uniformity, Jones added, would ‘impact on those people the most’.134  
Those people and businesses will be both from the UK and the EU27.135 
4.3.2. Family law 
The UK has opted in to the BIIa and MR (except with respect to the provisions on applicable 
law for maintenance obligations).136 As a sign of the fundamental UK interest in the area of 
international cooperation on family matters, the UK Government decided in October 2016 
(after the Brexit referendum) to opt in to the renegotiation of BIIa. In his evidence to the 
House of Lords Inquiry, Sir Oliver Heald, Minister of State for Courts and Justice, recounted 
that: 
 
                                                 
130 See Chapter 2 above. 
131 See the report by The Law Society of England and Wales, The economic value of the legal services sector, 
March 2016, London: Law Society of England and Wales at: http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-
services/research-trends/a-25-billion-legal-sector-supports-a-healthy-economy/. The report found that legal 
services contributed £25.7 billion to the UK’s economy. Prof Gilles Cuniberti found that between 2007 and 2012, 
11% of all international commercial contracts chose English contract law as the applicable law for the settlement 
of disputes; see Cuniberti, G., ‘The International Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws’, 
Northwest Journal of International Law and Business 34:3 ,2014, pp. 455-517.  
132 House of Lords, Brexit: justice for families, op. cit., 2017, para. 69.  
133 In his evidence to the House of Lords report ‘Brexit: justice for families, individuals, and businesses?’, Prof. 
Steve Peers said: ‘There is a risk … that people in the European Union will think this is an opportunity to divert or 
prevent business’. See House of Lords, Brexit: justice for families, 2017, op. cit., para. 41.   
134 House of Lords, Brexit: justice for families, 2017, para. 29. 
135 See also Dutta, A., ‘Brexit and international family law from a continental perspective’, Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 29:3, 2017, pp. 199-211. 
136 See MR Articles 23 and 24 regarding decisions for countries not bound by the 2007 Hague Protocol. This means 
that English decisions will not be automatically recognised in another State if they are manifestly contrary to public 
policy in that State, or where a decision was given in default of appearance, or the decision is irreconcilable with 
an earlier decision given in another jurisdiction. 
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‘When I became a Minister in this department we had to decide whether we wanted to remain 
part of the discussions about the revision of Brussels IIa, which is going on at the moment. I 
thought that we should stay in, so that when the law is transferred into UK law it is the very 
latest law and we are part of the Brussels I recast and Brussels IIa as well as the current 
arrangements, because it is a good system that helps with the arrangements for children and 
with matrimonial matters.137   
    
While recognising the importance of these Regulations during the House of Lords Inquiry, 
the Minister held back from revealing the Government’s goals in negotiations with the EU. 
The UK Government issued a ‘future partnership paper’ in late August 2017, ‘Providing a 
cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework’.138 That paper acknowledges the 
importance of continued civil judicial cooperation for businesses and individuals and the 
need for legal certainty, but it does not offer a clear path as to how that can be ensured in 
the relevant timeframes. 
 
4.4. Important areas of cooperation and challenges for future 
cooperation in civil matters 
 
At the time of writing it remains unclear how the level of cooperation in civil justice 
between the UK and the EU could be maintained or what, exactly, will replace it. This 
creates a huge amount of uncertainty for individuals and businesses that may be affected, 
in both the short and long term. The affected parties include any individual or business with 
commercial or personal ties in the UK and any other EU Member State or anyone from the 
EU who may visit the UK who may later need to take legal proceedings involving the UK.   
 
One of the challenges for future EU engagement is the fact that the UK is made up of 
fundamentally different legal systems: the jurisdictions of Scotland, Northern Ireland, and 
England and Wales, as well as different jurisdictions in Overseas Territories including 
Gibraltar and the Crown Dependencies. This is of particular importance for family law, as 
different UK jurisdictions operate very different laws in relation to the relocation of children 
following a family breakup and the division of family assets.139 
 
There are indications from the UK Government that this area of law would come under the 
category of ‘retained EU law’ for the purposes of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill.140 Yet neither 
family law nor civil and commercial law are the subject of substantive notes the UK 
Government published alongside the Withdrawal Bill. The recent ‘future partnerships paper’ 
states that the UK Government intends to incorporate the Rome I and II instruments on 
choice of law and applicable law in contractual and non-contractual matters into domestic 
                                                 
137 House of Lords, Corrected oral evidence : Brexit : civil justice co-operation and the CJEU, 31.12. 2017. Select 
Committee on the European Union, Justice Sub-Committee, 31.1.2017, Q41 at:  
 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-justice-
subcommittee/Brexit-civil-justice-cooperation/oral/46539.html.   
138 Department for Exiting the European Union, Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework – a 
future partnership paper, 22.8.2017 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/providing-a-cross-border-
civil-judicial-cooperation-framework-a-future-partnership-paper.  
139 For a summary of the fundamental differences in family law between Scotland and England and Wales, see: 
https://www.turcanconnell.com/media/blog/2015/09/scotsenglish-family-law-differences-affect-both-children-
and-money/. For a detailed analysis of Scottish family law, see Carruthers, J.M. and Crawford , E.B.,  ‘Divorcing 
Europe: reflections from a Scottish perspective on the implications of Brexit for cross-border divorce proceedings’, 
Child and Family Law Quarterly 29:3, 2017, pp. 233-252; on Northern Ireland see:  
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/publications/docs/family_rights/united_kingdom_northern_ireland_en.pdf;  and for 
Gibraltar, see Simpson, C., Family law in Gibraltar: overview at: https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/1-
5702325?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)& firstPage =true&bhcp=1  
140 See: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-2019/0005/cbill_2017-20190005_en_1.htm.  
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law, but there is no explicit commitment on BIR, BIIa or MR.141 Inclusion as retained EU law 
would mean that BIR, BIIa and MR would be reflected in UK law on exit day. This would not 
be enough, though, to fulfil the requirement of reciprocity needed for the regulations to 
function effectively across borders since the Withdrawal Bill is only domestic legislation and 
does not amount to an agreement with other countries.142 
 
The Withdrawal Bill is also problematic in terms of continued cooperation because it 
explicitly repeals the application of the rights and principles contained in the EU Charter 
and repeals the jurisdiction of the CJEU, both of which provide guarantees of a level playing 
field143 for the operation of international agreements and increase mutual trust in the EU.144 
A further problem with the Withdrawal Bill is the wide-ranging powers it gives to the 
executive to change retained EU law following exit day. This is controversial in terms of 
domestic rule of law.145 As the Withdrawal Bill provides no guarantee of continuity in UK 
law, it would be difficult for the EU or its Member States to rely on any apparent 
commitments in the Bill. Given the fundamental difference in approach between the 
common law system in England and Wales and the continental legal systems, it has been 
noted that continental lawyers should not lightly give up the level of control provided by the 
CJEU.146 
 
Reciprocity should not, however, be taken as the only basis for EU thinking on future 
judicial cooperation in civil matters with the UK. As one commentator has put it: 
 
Private international law primarily deals with relations between individuals in cross-border 
situations. The nonrecognition of a UK divorce decision on the continent might harm not only 
spouses with strong connections to the UK but also spouses with a nationality of, or a habitual 
residence in, one of the remaining Member States… in private international law, in general, 
and in international family law, in particular, a ‘prosecco’ versus ‘fish & chips’ approach to the 
future cooperation between the EU and the UK would be flawed. However, one should not 
close one’s eyes to the fact that reciprocal thinking will play a role in the political debate on 
the future cooperation in judicial matters. And from a strictly reciprocal perspective, the UK 
has more to lose than the remaining EU.147  
 
In this political climate, it will be important to ensure that individual rights are kept at the 
forefront of EU27 thinking. 
                                                 
141 Department for Exiting the European Union, Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework, 
2017, op. cit., para. 19. 
142 Prof. Steve Peers posed a practical question in his evidence to the House of Lords Inquiry: ‘What about every 
case that is pending on Brexit day? Do they continue under the rules of the EU regime? The same would apply to 
anything pending on the continent with British involvement or potential relevance for enforcement’. See House of 
Lords, Brexit: justice for families, 2017, op. cit., para. 41. 
143 In terms of the regulatory framework around areas like workers’ rights and data protection as well as a 
common approach to judicial oversight. 
144 See EU (Withdrawal) Bill, Section 5(4), Section 6.  
145 See selection of public law analyses at: https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/07/18/resources-the-eu-
withdrawal-bill/, including Angela Patrick’s blog (http://Brexit.doughtystreet.co.uk/post/102ebeo/eu-withdrawal-
bill-you-say-tomato-i-say-unprecedented-executive-power). 
146 ‘The European instruments are – as we know since Lord Goff’s famous dictum in Airbus Industries – rather 
continentally influenced, and so rather different from what a common law approach to private international law 
issues would entail. From a continental perspective, judicial control is, therefore, much more necessary to ensure 
a uniform approach is taken to the interpretation of obligations involving the UK compared, for example, to the 
current cooperation between the EU and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland under the Lugano system, where the 
decisions of the European Court of Justice do not formally bind the third state courts but to which only ‘due 
account’ must be paid. The past has impressively shown – one has only to mention Turner, Owusu and West 
Tankers – that considerable pressure was needed from the European Court of Justice to bring the English courts in 
line with the European instruments. As a continental lawyer, one should not give up that control lightly’. Dutta 
‘Brexit and international family law’, 2017, op. cit., p. 210. 
147 Dutta, Brexit and international family law,  2017, op. cit., pp. 208-9. 
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Ultimately, for there to be continuity in relation to private international law (and potentially 
any redraft of BIIa), there will need to be a new legal agreement or agreements between 
the UK and the EU. The House of Lords Inquiry, which studied the options in relation to the 
BIR, BIIa, and MR, was concerned that there were no clear ways forward to secure the 
undoubted benefits of the regulations post-Brexit. While there has been much talk about 
‘transitional arrangements’ in various areas, the time pressures of Article 50 and the 
complexity of the issues involved make it unclear whether it would be quicker to reach 
transitional arrangements or to establish new agreements altogether. 
4.4.1. Options for the BIR 
Retaining the BIR may be of greater immediate concern to the UK than to the EU27 
because it will have a particularly acute impact on UK businesses and legal services. The 
House of Lords Inquiry affirmed, ‘We are in no doubt that legal uncertainty, with its 
inherent costs to litigants, will follow Brexit unless there are provisions in a withdrawal or 
transitional agreement specifically addressing the BIR’.148 
 
If the BIR ceases to apply in the UK, this will undoubtedly impede access to justice and 
effective remedies in cross-border legal disputes involving the UK. This will have the most 
acute impact on individuals and small and medium enterprises who do not have the 
resources to launch into complex international litigation with heightened costs or who may 
find themselves signing up to arbitration agreements which risk undermining open 
justice.149 While there is no precedent for non-EU countries being party to the BIR, this 
does not mean that such a thing is impossible.  
 
The UK ‘future partnership paper’ suggests that the UK will seek to continue to participate 
in the 2007 Lugano Convention (which forms the basis for EU cooperation with Norway, 
Iceland and Switzerland).150 However, the UK is not currently a state party to the Lugano 
Convention, which was signed by the EU.151  Therefore, for the post-Brexit UK to participate 
in the Lugano Convention, it will need to seek the prior authorisation of the EU and the 
other participating States; any one of the convention parties could veto the request.152 
Given the time pressures and the potential implications for citizens’ rights and the need for 
legal certainty for businesses, discussions around potential accession of the UK to the 
Lugano Convention should be started as soon as possible. 
 
This issue, which has already started to affect businesses concerned about future 
uncertainty, should be addressed as a matter of urgency as part of the negotiations on the 
Withdrawal Agreement and as part of the agreement for future relations between the EU 
and the UK. However, the UK’s red line on CJEU jurisdiction and its stance on the rights and 
principles in the EU Charter may make it difficult to negotiate agreements that would stand 
up to CJEU scrutiny. 
 
                                                 
148 House of Lords, Brexit: justice for families, 2017, op. cit., para. 61. 
149 Ibid.  
150 Department for Exiting the European Union, Providing a cross-border civil judicial cooperation framework, 
2017, op. cit., para. 22. 
151 Cf. Council of the European Union, Council Decision of 27 November 2008 concerning the conclusion of the 
Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. OJ 
L 147/1, 10.6.2009.  
152 Cf. Lugano Convention, Articles 70(1) (c), 73(3).  
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4.4.2. Options for BIIa and MR 
The BIIa and the MR have added to and replaced existing frameworks for international 
family law, such as the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, 
Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and 
Measures for the Protection of Children and the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction. As The Hague Conventions still operate for non-EU 
countries, they could provide some degree of a fallback position.153 Some commentators 
have indicated that a return to The Hague Conventions would not be a significant problem 
for the EU27.154 But these conventions do not cover all aspects of law covered by the BIIa 
and the MR, like matrimonial law: both the BIIa and MR have been developed to facilitate 
judicial cooperation in this sensitive area, thus greatly improving on the Hague frameworks.   
   
The European Union asserts that it has exclusive external competence in the field of 
international family law.155 This means that a Member State cannot engage with a third 
country bilaterally or through The Hague Conventions in this field unless it has secured 
unanimous agreement and a Council Decision to that effect.156 Clarification is needed as to 
how this will affect the ability of Member States to engage through the Hague Conventions 
with the UK as a third country.157 In relation to the 2007 The Hague Maintenance 
Convention, the UK will have to exercise its external competence while still bound by the 
Convention as a Member State even though, under EU law, the EU still has exclusive 
external competence.158  To ensure that it remains in force for the UK without any break 
would be best done with an agreement of the EU recognising the unique situation around 
Brexit. 
 
It appears that both regulations will be included under the category of retained EU law in 
the Withdrawal Bill. But this does not resolve the fundamental issue of reciprocity in cross-
border disputes or the problem of legal certainty in the future (given the broad powers in 
the Bill for the UK Government to change retained law with minimal scrutiny after Brexit). 
The situation is even more legally complicated by the fact that the BIIa is currently being 
renegotiated, with the UK involved in the negotiations but without having committed itself 
to the final results of the negotiations. The BIIa regime’s interaction with The Hague 
Conventions is an area that will require further in-depth legal analysis in the negotiations 
on withdrawal and future arrangements with the UK. 
                                                 
153 Denmark has also not signed up to the BIIa. 
154 ‘This “downgrading” of UK decisions in child matters from the Brussels II bis to The Hague Convention system 
will have no particularly far-reaching consequences. The Brussels II bis Regulation – including its provisions on 
recognition and enforcement – mainly followed the solutions of the 1996 Hague Convention. However, the 
instruments do differ in detail. In particular, under Article 26 of The Hague Convention, certain access and return 
orders from the UK will no longer be enforced on the continent without exequatur, that is, without a declaration of 
enforceability by the local authorities, unlike under Article 40 and ff. Brussels II bis’. Dutta (2017), Brexit and 
international family law, op. cit., 202.  
155 See Court of Justice of the European Union Opinion 1/13 of the Court (Grand Chamber) 14.1.2014 (Opinion 
pursuant to Article 213(11) TFEU – Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction – Accession of 
third states – Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 – Exclusive external competence of the European Union – Risk of 
undermining the uniform and consistent application of EU rules and the proper functioning of the system which 
they establish), ECLI: EU:C, pp. 2014:2303. 
156  Dutta, Brexit and international family law, op. cit., p. 208.  
157 ‘As this Opinion concerned the issue of competence to conclude an international agreement, the Court 
consistently first refers to Article 216(1) TFEU as well as to the relevant provision of the internal policy concerned 
(here: Article 81(3) TFEU regarding the area of family law with cross-border implications) to establish that the 
Union has competence in the area that forms the subject matter of the 1980 Hague Convention, before entering, 
in a second step, into the analysis as to whether or not that competence of the Union is exclusive, referring for 
that purpose to Article 3(2) TFEU and earlier case law’. Elbacher, F., ‘Recent Case Law on External Competences of 
the European Union: How Member States Can Embrace Their Own Treaty’, CLEER Papers, 02.2017. The Hague: 
Centre for the Law of EU External Relations, 2017, p.10 at: http://www.asser.nl/media/3485/cleer17-2_web.pdf. 
158 See Beaumont, P.,  ‘Private international law concerning children in the UK after Brexit: comparing Hague 
Treaty law with EU Regulations’, Child and Family Law Quarterly 29:3 , 2017,  p.p 213-232 at p. 214.  
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In the interests of legal certainty, the EU27 will need to be clear on how they will deal with 
UK decisions issued before Brexit date. This is particularly important for divorce decisions, 
which continue to have legal effect for many years after they are issued. One way of 
addressing this is to continue to apply BIIa for those decisions. But unless a provision to 
that effect is included in the Withdrawal Agreement, this is likely to be a matter for national 
law, which may lead to patchy application across the EU.159 Including provisions on the 
future recognition of pre-Brexit UK decisions in family law in the Withdrawal Agreement 
would help to ensure a smoother transition in this area by providing a unified legal basis in 
EU law. 
 
If the BIIa and the MR cease to apply to the UK and there is no replacement, the 
implications for the fundamental rights of children but also vulnerable people in family 
breakdown situations will be very significant. The problem will be exacerbated when there 
is an economic power imbalance between partners or when economic coercion is used as a 
tool for domestic abuse. This will affect people in the EU and the UK. There is, therefore, 
clearly a strong interest for the EU to retain in the future some form of enhanced 
cooperation with the UK in relation to the matters covered by BIIa and MR; it appears that 
this is a mutual interest for the UK, as it has decided to opt in to the renegotiation of BIIa. 
It is impossible to estimate the number of people in the EU or EU nationals in the UK who 
will be affected, immediately or in the future, by the disapplication of BIIa and MR in the 
UK in the absence of an alternative agreement on Brexit. It is clear that vulnerable people, 
including children, will be most acutely affected by the changes. The impact on them could 
be life-changing. The EU has a strong interest in trying to reach an agreement as early as 
possible in the negotiations on withdrawal from the EU in order to ensure clarity and 
certainty in cross-border family law disputes. This part of the negotiations should focus on 
individual rights rather than the broader political considerations around reciprocity.   
 
As with the BIR, it is not clear whether separate transitional arrangements would be any 
easier to negotiate than a new agreement, but provisions relating to international family 
law should be included in the Withdrawal Agreement and in any agreement on future 
relations negotiated with the UK. These provisions do not appear to have been discussed at 
all in the negotiations so far and do not feature in either the EU or UK negotiating positions 
on citizens’ rights.160 As with other areas of cooperation, the UK’s red line on CJEU 
jurisdiction may make it difficult to reach an agreement that will survive CJEU scrutiny and 
thus guarantee legal certainty in the future. How this will be managed will depend on what 
alternatives can be found around the broader question of the role of the CJEU or other 
models of judicial oversight after Brexit.161 
 
The House of Lords Inquiry found that, for the UK, ‘[t]o walk away from these Regulations 
without putting alternatives in place would seriously undermine the family law rights of UK 
citizens and would, ultimately, be an act of self-harm’.162 The same could be said for the 
EU, as EU citizens and residents with links to the UK would be equally affected. There is, 
therefore, a reciprocal interest in prioritising the issue of international cooperation in family 
law so as to ensure continuity and to make sure that the EU, at least, puts individual rights 
ahead of political strategy. How that is done, however, is debatable. It has been suggested 
that future cooperation with the UK should be on the basis that the UK abandons ‘cherry 
                                                 
159 See Dutta, Brexit and international family law, 2017, op. cit., p. 204. See also the 12 July 2017 European 
Commission Position Paper on Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Commercial Matters at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/essential-principles-civil-commercial-matters_en_0.pdf.  
160 See Joint Technical Note, Comparison of EU/UK positions on citizens’ rights, 2017, op. cit.  
161 This issue requires separate detailed consideration which goes beyond the remit of this study. 
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picking’ and takes on board the entire international family law acquis.163 But the political 
uncertainty in the UK around Brexit makes it uncertain that such a negotiating position 
would have a realistic chance of success. What is clear, however, is that on issues like this 
which will have a serious impact on individuals, the EU should be drawing up clear 
proposals as a matter of urgency, regardless of the level of reciprocity in the negotiations 
with the UK. 
 
4.5. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
EU judicial cooperation instruments in both the criminal and civil spheres reflect the high 
level of mutual trust across the EU. The role of the CJEU is crucial in ensuring that 
comparable and enforceable standards are in place across the Union, so a pre-requisite to 
the establishment of any future relationships between the UK and the EU in this area is an 
agreement between the UK and the EU on CJEU jurisdiction. The UK’s current stance on 
both the CJEU and the rights and principles contained in the EU Charter may make it 
difficult to continue the current high level of cooperation after withdrawal. To ensure legal 
certainty and the protection of fundamental rights around the withdrawal itself, the 
Withdrawal Agreement should clearly set out transitional arrangements relating to 
proceedings that have already started or events that have occurred prior to withdrawal. 
 
The importance of continued judicial cooperation in criminal matters for security and 
bringing suspects to justice and in civil matters for families, including vulnerable children, 
as well as travelers, consumers and businesses, should not be underestimated. Some 
regional and international law mechanisms, like the ECE and The Hague Conventions on 
International Family Law, cover these areas, but so that they can be applied seamlessly, 
legislation implementing these international arrangements may need to be amended in EU 
Member States to reflect the new relationship with the UK. 
 
There are some existing agreements with third countries that may serve as a model, such 
as the agreements on surrender to Norway and Iceland, third-country agreements with 
Eurojust, and the Lugano Convention, but negotiations with third countries in these areas 
have been time-consuming. The current time frame, with limited progress on Article 50 
negotiations and less than 18 months remaining before the UK leaves the EU, makes it 
unrealistic to believe that such agreements could be concluded and put into force in time to 
ensure a smooth transition. Without an agreement over continued jurisdiction of the CJEU 
over any transitional period, transitional arrangements beyond those addressing ongoing 
proceedings are unlikely to be any simpler to conclude.  
 
Given the importance of these issues, the potential impact on individual rights, and the 
extreme time pressures in areas where it is clear that there would be a mutual benefit in 
continued cooperation, the relevant EU institutions should start to engage the UK to discuss 
future agreements (to the extent possible given the current progress of negotiations).   
 
                                                                                                                                                            
162 House of Lords, Brexit: justice for families, 2017, op. cit., para. 93.  
163 Dutta, Brexit and international family law, 2017, op. cit., p. 210.  
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5. POLICE COOPERATION 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Police cooperation in the EU is part of a wider global system that needs to be taken 
into account in Brexit negotiations. 
 Future cooperation of some sort is needed to ensure continued security and 
combating cross-border crime, but negotiations should reflect the need to protect 
the integrity of the EU system. 
 Police cooperation raises fundamental questions over the relationship between 
sovereignty and security. 
 The UK’s departure from the EU offers an opportunity for a new drive towards 
strengthened EU cooperation in this area. 
 
 
A major challenge of Brexit for police and security cooperation is the multiplicity of 
jurisdictions and authorities involved. In the UK, policing is regulated differently in England 
and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. UK policing also involves central services such 
as the National Crime Agency (established in 2013), specialist bodies with policing 
competencies including state security services (MI5, MI6) and sectoral services (e.g. British 
Transport Police), as well as a variety of regulatory and municipal authorities and bodies.164 
This situation is mirrored both at the EU level and among EU Member States.165 Multiple 
and sometimes conflicting strategic and political interests are in play, making it very 
difficult to assess precisely the benefits of particular negotiating positions to one party or 
the other. Further complexity is added by the current uncertain state of UK politics, 
particularly bearing in mind the constitutional issues around the devolved nations with their 
own security, criminal justice and political agendas, as well as the thorny question of the 
Irish border, all of which makes it very difficult to predict the outcome of negotiations in 
this area. 
 
From the perspective of law-enforcement practitioners, fast and effective cross-border 
cooperation is critical to policing performance. EU measures in this area have made police 
cooperation and access to information less slow and cumbersome than the old-fashioned 
types of cooperation that UK politicians often laud. Arguments over police operational 
effectiveness will be crucial in shaping the future relationship between the EU and the UK. 
The caricature of the EU as an inefficient bureaucracy or a shadowy federal power, as 
portrayed in some circles, should be avoided. 
 
Police cooperation needs to be understood in its broader context, incorporating activities 
carried out by both intelligence agencies and specialised police units with intelligence 
functions: this creates a level of interdependence between intelligence agencies and police 
                                                 
164 See e.g. Crawford, A, ‘Plural policing in the UK: policing beyond the police’, Handbook of Policing, edited by T. 
Newburn, 147-181. London: Routledge (Second Edition), 2008. 
165 For recent comparative work, see inter alia: Devroe, E., Tepstra, J., ‘Plural Policing in Western Europe: a 
comparison’, European Journal on Policing Studies 3.2, April 2015, pp. 235-245; O’Neill, M., Fyfe, N.R., ‘Plural 
Policing in Europe: relationships and governance in contemporary security systems’, Policing and Society 27.1, 
2017, pp. 1-5 (introduction to special issue on theme). 
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forces that goes beyond strict EU competence. The UK has been one of the drivers of a 
model of policing that makes exceptional measures routine (particularly in the context of 
counter-terrorism) while resisting judicial oversight, which is seen as an impediment to 
effective policing and national security.166 Proponents of the UK model have tended to 
criticise EU-rules-based policing models when they have been unsuccessful in influencing 
the evolution of EU police cooperation. Many law enforcement officials in the EU27 who 
support this vision of a pragmatic, results-based policing are likely to support a continued 
strong relationship with the UK despite Brexit. Other practitioners will be pleased to be rid 
of the UK’s political reluctance to support any kind of integrated European approach to 
policing which could lead to a form of supranational decision-making power in the field. For 
many in the EU27 who want to develop more effective and integrated EU policing 
initiatives, the blockage the UK has thrown up to such initiatives is a major problem that 
Brexit can solve. 
 
In this area, therefore, Brexit is double-edged, and the EU will need to decide whether 
continued close cooperation with the UK at any cost, even at the risk of further watering 
down the coherence of the AFSJ, is key to the security of EU citizens or whether the 
departure of the UK will pave the way for projects that may construct a coherent, 
centralised, efficient system of policing that can act as a platform of integration of 
information for the different EU-Schengen national member states. 
 
5.1. UK involvement in police cooperation 
 
From the EU perspective, accepting the UK’s cherry-picking position on EU policies and 
legal standards may create significant problems in reaching further agreements on police 
cooperation that meet the EU’s imperatives in terms of free movement of persons, data 
protection, and control over ex-third pillar measures. The UK’s refusal to domesticate the 
rights and principles in the EU Charter or to submit to the CJEU may lead to others asking 
for similar concessions, which would create a threat to legal certainty and order in 
European law. The EU, therefore, needs to make sure that future police cooperation 
supports operational continuity in police responses to transnational threats while remaining 
coordinated and compatible with EU data-protection laws and under CJEU oversight. This is 
likely to be a significant stumbling block in negotiations, with the sovereignty question 
overshadowing the question of police cooperation in practice. 
 
From the UK perspective, police cooperation with the EU is not its only focus. The UK is 
already negotiating actively in other arenas (the transatlantic context, Five Eyes and 
Interpol). There is no indication that the EU is doing the same at this stage and thus it is 
failing to recognise the wider international web of policing at stake. At the moment, UK 
membership in EU security arrangements is a gateway for Five Eyes counterparts. It is 
uncertain how this will develop after Brexit, with some analysts considering that the UK’s 
strength lies in its intermediary role rather than its own capabilities. 
 
Once the central goal of negotiations is identified, the second step is to understand in detail 
the scope of the negotiations as well as the external factors in play (which may well prove 
to be more crucial than the negotiations themselves). Some networks are not EU 
mechanisms as such, even if the EU or its most powerful Member States may be key 
                                                 
166 The debate around investigatory powers and bulk surveillance in the UK has been followed across Europe. The 
UK Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is particularly contentious because of the bulk surveillance powers it introduces. 
See e.g. Anderson, D, Q.C Report of the Bulk Powers Review – Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. 
London: The Stationery Office, 2016, Cm 9326, at: https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/Bulk-Powers-Review-final-report.pdf (accessed November 2017). 
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participants. It is crucial to understand that the negotiation process goes beyond EU 
institutions and the UK by affecting relations with many other actors, including US 
intelligence agencies (NSA, CIA, FBI) and international institutions (United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Interpol). 
 
5.1.1. Information exchange 
At least six types of information exchange in police matters (intelligence and border) can be 
distinguished. Depending on how each fits within EU frameworks, there are different 
implications after Brexit. The first type of exchange concerns strictly informal collaboration 
through direct communication, meetings and the presence of bilateral liaison officers not 
integrated within the EU Liaison Officers’ networks.167 This type of exchange will continue 
regardless of formal agreements, and a ‘hard Brexit’ may revive these old practices. The 
second type of information exchange involves international electronic surveillance and 
geostrategic concerns.168 This is based on networks and instruments beyond the EU, known 
as Five Eyes+, and will not be directly dealt with in EU-UK negotiations. The third type, 
which is not strictly within EU competence, involves the external secret services of Member 
States exchanging information on targeted intelligence around specific groups.169 The 
fourth type is a network of information exchange about individual terrorism suspects and 
potential links between them. This operates through different national coordination centres 
on terrorism, some of whom collaborate regularly with Europol.170 Different agencies, 
including Europol, Eurojust and Frontex, are involved; the information exchange happens 
not only through police agencies but also other agencies working at borders (border 
guards, customs and military police). Following the UK departure, including the departure 
of UK officials, the remaining Member States may try to reinforce the integration of a level 
of decision making between EU agencies and possibly with some influential third parties. 
The fifth type of cooperation in terms of data exchange deals with specialised agencies 
working closely with banks and other private companies to trace illicit financial flows.171  
 
While the UK has been a leader in this field in many ways, it has been generally resistant to 
the involvement of prosecutors and magistrates and particularly opposed to the creation of 
a European prosecutor. This reflects a fundamental difference between common law and 
civil law approaches to criminal procedures and evidence gathering. The sixth type of 
cooperation involves the links between the intelligence capabilities of border guards and 
policing matters. 
 
5.1.2. Counterterrorism and security 
In terms of public statements, future cooperation on counter-terrorism seems to be 
relatively safe in the negotiations since both sides recognise its fundamental importance. 
Continued collective efforts to tackle terrorism feature as a goal in the UK Government’s 
exit strategy.172 But since counter-terrorism cooperation raises questions in highly disputed 
areas like global strategy (linked to foreign affairs and defence) as well as privacy, the 
                                                 
167 Aldrich, R.J, ‘International intelligence cooperation in practice’, in International intelligence cooperation and 
accountability, eds. Born, H. Leigh,I.  and  Wills,A.  New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 18-41. 
168 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Current practices in electronic surveillance in the investigation 
of serious and organized crime. New York: United Nations Publications, 2009. 
169 Anonymous interviews; see also Den Boer, M., Hillebrand, C. and Nölke, A.  ‘Legitimacy under Pressure: The 
European Web of Counter-Terrorism networks’, Journal of Common Market Studies 46:1, 2008, pp. 101-124. 
170 For instance, see: www.mi5.gov.uk/joint-terrorism-analysis-centre and www.europol.europa.eu/about-
europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-1. 
171 On Financial Intelligence Units, see: www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/financial-intelligence-units-fiu-net 
and https://egmontgroup.org/en/content/financial-intelligence-units-fius.  
172 Department for Exiting the European Union,  The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the 
European Union White Paper,  02.2.2017 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-united-kingdoms-
exit-from-and-new-partnership-with-the-european-union-white-paper. 
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details may be thorny to iron out. The UK and US have often taken different approaches on 
these issues than other major EU Member States. The agencies involved take very different 
approaches in terms of information exchange and the channels used, with many avoiding 
Europeanisation because of the legal constraints of formal mutual legal assistance.173 
The so-called Five Eyes+ network is critically important for signal and internet 
intelligence.174 The US will play a pivotal role when it decides how important the ‘special 
relationship’ with the UK and, in particular, GCHQ, is to its security once the UK ceases to 
give the US access to EU networks. In this ‘market of circulation of sensitive information’, 
some EU governments could look upon Brexit as an opportunity to replace the UK from the 
traditional role of ‘broker’ that it has monopolized.    The USA will need to decide whether it 
shifts allegiances to EU institutions or one or two key member states (e.g., Germany, 
France or Sweden). Despite the continuous efforts of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 
Gilles de Kerchove, and the recent creation of a European Centre on Counter-Terrorism 
(ECTC) inside Europol, this type of exchange at the strategic level is not within the scope of 
EU policy.175 Galileo and a reinforcement of strategic military capacities at EU level may 
change the state of play.176 As of now, the primary role EU institutions have played in this 
area has been through challenges to the CJEU and checks imposed by the European 
Parliament because of the risks to privacy posed by large-scale surveillance.177 
 
In relation to targeted surveillance, the EU institutions have some influence due to the need 
to respect democratic principles and the rule of law, but TEU provisions clearly state that 
national security activities are the sole responsibility of member states.178 Information 
exchange between military intelligence services is not directly within EU competence, and 
many of the key actors are external. For good reason, and despite active encouragement 
from the US, NATO, and, paradoxically, some UK officials, the EU has never tried to engage 
in a US-style reorganisation of Homeland Security. But after each terrorist attack, the 
suggestion that it could have been prevented with a more fused approach returns, an 
argument often accompanied by the idea that judicial control ties the hands of counter-
terrorism agencies. 
 
While the Situation Centre (Sitcen), and later on the Intelligence and Situation Centre 
(Intcen) have certainly permitted small EU27 Member States to have a say in some 
circumstances, most EU Member States with strong intelligence capabilities, such as 
France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK, have tried to keep their relations outside an EU 
legal framework that could be a serious constraint or lead to the condemnation of state 
                                                 
173 This has particularly been the case for exchanges of information in police and intelligence matters. See inter 
alia: Brown, I., ‘The feasibility of transatlantic privacy-protective standards for surveillance’,  International Journal 
of Law and Information Technology 23.1, March 2015, pp. 23-40; Cole, D.D., Fabbrini, F.,  Schulhofer, S. eds. 
Surveillance, privacy and transatlantic relations. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017. 
174 ‘The long-standing Five Eyes partner agencies of the US NSA are the UK GCHQ, Canadian Communications 
Security Establishment, Australian Digital Signals Directorate and New Zealand Government Communications 
Security Bureau. In addition, Snowden has revealed networks of bilateral and multilateral digital intelligence 
relationships with countries such as the “SIGINT Seniors”: the Five Eyes plus France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, 
Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark, and others in Africa, South America and Asia, involving 
shared access to global communications and exchanges of technical information and techniques’. Omand, D. 
‘Understanding Digital Intelligence and the Norms that Might Govern It’, Global Commission on Internet 
Governance Paper Series, no. 8. Waterloo, Canada and London: CIGI and Chatham House. At p. 5, note. 24, 
2015. 
175 See Europol, European Counter Terrorism Centre – ECTC at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-
europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc. 
176 See European Space Agency, What is Galileo? at: http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Navigation/Galileo/ 
What_is_Galileo. 
177 For further detail, see Chapter 6 of this study on data protection. 
178 TEU, Article 4(2). 
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activity.179 Framing security as a transversal subject far beyond policing has been a key 
initiative. The questions around the legality of these agreements, not formally EU 
instruments but including major EU Member States, along with the possibility of oversight 
by organs of Member States or courts, including European courts, will certainly come back 
as a central issue in the post-Brexit world. This is especially true if the UK stands alone (or 
alongside the US) in refusing supervisory mechanisms from EU institutions regarding the 
necessity and proportionality of the measures taken in these information exchanges. Even 
when national security is at stake, EU institutions have played a key role in this area 
whenever privacy and human rights have been concerned by insisting on the application of 
the rule of law.180 
 
5.1.3. Operational and institutional cooperation 
The real transformation of information exchange in police matters has been the 
development of agencies like Europol, Eurojust, EU-Lisa, and Frontex, as well as a change 
of attitude concerning information exchange about individuals suspected of terrorism, 
serious or organised crime or even immigration irregularities. The different EU agencies and 
their mutual relations have created a specific web of information exchange. After much 
debate, the importance of the principle of privacy has been recognised, if not put 
completely into practice. Despite national differences of opinion in this area, EU agencies 
have developed different characteristics to national policing. Care needs to be taken that 
the Brexit negotiations do not start a period of deconstruction in this field of EU internal 
security. 
 
Over a period of more than thirty years, the EU has built an interconnected network on 
policing matters concerning suspects of terrorism (often identified), suspects of financing of 
terrorism and organised crime, suspects of radicalization, suspects of organised crime, and 
suspects of illegal crossing and overstay. There has been no ‘fusion’ as such. But EU-Lisa, 
by monopolising the question of technical interoperability, and Europol have become the 
key nodes of this EU network. 
 
The creation of Europol in the 1990s changed this part of the ‘game’ profoundly. Europol 
has strengthened the autonomy of the EU beyond the role of some EU Member States and 
has become a central place for contacts used by other police forces in the world. The 
different intelligence and police services of the US have changed their position of 
indifference towards Europol to one of attempting to acquire ‘influence’. Most of the strong 
third parties now insist on being partners of Europol, be it on cross-border crime, organised 
crime (via meetings around SOCTA) or terrorism. Frontex has also succeeded in becoming 
a node for border control and, in relation with EU-LISA, surveillance of travellers and future 
PNRs.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this study to explain Europol’s major successes, such as 
integrating previous police officials who were in the TREVI and Pompidou clubs, opening 
police analysis to non-police officials, formalising more explicitly the channels of 
communication, providing (as ‘agencification’ was reinforced) specific personnel of analysts 
(more than one hundred in 2016, in addition to Europol Liaison Officers), pushing the 
                                                 
179 IntCen (until 2012 the term used was ‘SitCen’) is the intelligence capability of the EU that provides intelligence 
analysis on security threats to EU decision-makers on the basis of material provided by internal and external 
intelligence services of EU Member States. For more details, see Factsheet on EU Intelligence Analyses Center 
(INTCEN) at: http://eu-un.europa.eu/factsheet-on-eu-intelligence-analyses-center-intcen/. 
180 See, in particular, reports on CIA activities and the complicity of some EU services in extraordinary renditions 
and CJEU judgments on data protection. 
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agencies of Member States to use harmonised incident data collection practices, sharing the 
same approach for threat evaluation, multiplying research groups developing strategic 
analysis, supporting law enforcement operations, and building centres on counter-terrorism 
and cyber-crime within the agency. But it is very clear that the EU and it Member States 
have an absolutely major asset in Europol, which now coordinates actions in more than 
40,000 investigations per year and is building the Europol Information System (EIS), which 
gathers information on terrorism and serious and organised crime and correlates data in a 
better way than national services themselves. 
 
Europol has also been a major player (in liaison with Eurojust) in organising a strong 
framework regarding EU criminal law. It is trying to integrate the network of specialised 
finance organizations working on the financing of organised crime and terrorism. Europol 
provides an additional conduit of cooperation for police forces across Europe. Because of its 
excellence, Europol is the EU’s preferred agency for law enforcement cooperation. It 
operates under a solid legislative framework which has been renewed over the years, 
thereby making Europol one of the most integrated security tools the EU has ever 
achieved.181 The success of the Europeanisation in this type of policing is at the heart of the 
Brexit negotiations, illustrating the disjuncture between police collaboration and arguments 
of ‘national’ sovereignty in policing. UK practitioners have been proud to participate in 
Europol; after each general opt-out, they have fought for specific re-opt-ins along their 
main interests.  
 
Following the block opt out from pre-Lisbon criminal and policing measures, in December 
2014 the British government re-joined Council Decision 2009/371/JHA (6 April 2009) which 
reformed Europol as an EU agency. In December 2016, the UK opted back in to the Europol 
Regulation.182 The UK will thus remain a full member of Europol until the UK leaves the EU. 
The Europol Regulation replaces and repeals several relating Council Decisions.183 The UK 
has the largest liaison bureau for a Member State at Europol; its bureau is a multi-agency 
structure of seventeen personnel representing a range of different disciplines (ranging from 
serious organised crime to customs, immigration and counter-terrorism).184 At home, 
Britain’s Europol National Unit (ENU) is the designated point of contact for information 
exchange between Europol and the forty-three national police forces. The British liaison 
bureau at Europol and the ENU are electronically connected through SIENA (Secure 
Information Exchange Network Application). SIENA is a platform of communication 
exchange between liaison bureaus, ENUs, Europol’s analysts and experts, and third parties 
with whom Europol has cooperation agreements.185 The UK is also the second largest 
                                                 
181 Following Council Decision 2009/371/JHA, Europol became an EU agency. The decision replaces the Europol 
Convention of 1995 (including the three amending protocols) on which the agency was originally established. On 1 
May 2017, this decision was replaced by the Europol Regulation 2016/794. This regulation steps up the role of 
Europol as a hub for information exchange between law enforcement authorities.  
182 European Commission , Commission Decision 2017/388 of 6 March 2017 confirming the participation of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, OJ L 59/39, 7.3.2017. 
183 Council of the European Union, Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office 
(Europol), OJ L 121/37, 15.5.2009; Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2009/934/JHA of 30 
November 2009 adopting the implementing rules governing Europol's relations with partners, including the 
exchange of personal data and classified information, OJ L 325/6, 11.12.2009; Council of the European Union, 
Council Decision 2009/935/JHA of 30 November 2009 determining the list of third States and organisations with 
which Europol shall conclude agreements, OJ L 325/12, 11.12.2009; Council of the European Union, Council 
Decision 2009/936/JHA of 30 November 2009 adopting the implementing rules for Europol analysis work files, OJ 
L 325.14, 11.12.2009; and Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2009/968/JHA of 30 November 2009 
adopting the rules on the confidentiality of Europol information, OJ L 332/17, 17.12.2009. 
184 House of Lords, ‘Brexit: future UK-EU security and police cooperation’, HL Paper 77, 16.12.2016, pp. 15-21 at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/77/77.pdf.  
185Europol, Secure information exchange network application (SIENA), at:  
https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/services-support/information-exchange/secure-information-
exchange-network-application-siena. 
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contributor to EIS, Europol’s central criminal information and intelligence database.186 The 
UK currently participates in all of Europol’s EMPACT projects (13 in total), leading or co-
leading almost half of them.187 Through its National Crime Agency (NCA), the UK has 
exported its intelligence-led policing (ILP) model, with Europol’s Serious Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment (SOCTA) reflecting many of ILP’s principles. In parallel, the UK took a 
lead role in setting up the EU Policy Cycle on International Serious and Organised Crime, 
which is also based on the ILP model.188 Lastly, Britain is ranked fourth in terms of human 
input to Europol’s workforce, with sixty-seven staff in total (seventeen liaison officers and 
fifty staff members on EU contracts).189 Despite Europol being subject to political criticisms 
in the UK for many years, the UK clearly understands the value of Europol in practice. 
 
5.2. Challenges for future engagement 
 
From the perspective of British law enforcement officials, the UK has a clear interest in 
maintaining cooperation with the EU on policing matters. Europol membership is listed as a 
top priority by the NCA, a position that has remained unchanged since 2012 when Europol 
was part of the JHA measures targeted by the British opt-out. At that time, Europol was 
categorised a ‘vital’ measure to UK policing.190 But, as in other areas, the UK position is 
contradictory. On the one hand, it wants a lead role at Europol (‘Britain will demand a 
leading role in Europol after Brexit’, The Telegraph headlines); on the other hand, Home 
Secretary Amber Rudd has already warned that the UK might take away its information if 
no agreement with Europol is reached.191 On the day the UK leaves the EU, it will become a 
third country in regard to Europol. UK withdrawal means that the UK might lose its rights at 
Europol, i.e., access to EIS, a seat on Europol’s strategic body (Management Board), and 
posting of liaison officers. This could have a detrimental effect on the ability to cooperate 
effectively by other member states and, by extension, Europol. 
 
Rationally, in view of the mandate of protecting EU citizens and delivering security, 
retaining access to information and sustaining information exchange are the immediate 
objectives of EU police cooperation. Helping the UK to continue participating at a high level 
seems also to increase the EU’s security.  
 
The feasibility of achieving this objective on the day the UK leaves the EU nevertheless 
depends on whether a future agreement will provide continuity to information exchange or 
will be based on ad-hoc and asymmetric exchanges giving the UK the power to decide case 
by case while asking more and more from the EU in terms of relaxing judicial controls in 
the name of operational effectiveness. A post-Brexit agreement can be achieved if both 
parties (UK and EU) agree on provisions that offer the same level of coherence and legal 
certainty as existing arrangements.192 In addition, this depends upon the UK granting data 
protection arrangements meeting EU standards. 
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189 Ibid. 
190 House of Lords, EU police and criminal justice measures: the UK’s 2014 opt-out decision, HL Paper 159, 
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5.2.1. The UK’s vision of its future in police cooperation 
The following statement by Brandon Lewis, Minister of State for Policing and the Fire 
Service, to the House of Lords gives a sense of the UK’s vision of its future as a ‘global 
actor’ which strategically positions itself to maintain ties with the EU while continuing to 
work with international partners:  
  
‘We are also looking at that more widely because we want to be a good partner to our 
colleagues across Europe. In the same way, we want to be a good partner with other 
countries—we have security and law enforcement issues that we share with countries around 
the world. We want to ensure that we have strong relationships with them in the same way 
as we want to continue having strong relations with our European colleagues. … we are 
leaving the European Union but we are not leaving our position as a partner to countries 
across Europe’.193  
 
The UK Government starts from the assumption that since the UK has been an EU Member 
State, it stands in a position different from other countries which have not been EU 
members. On this basis it advocates a special status reflecting its EU trajectory, its 
contribution to the EU in terms of expertise and knowledge, and its international links. The 
UK’s exit strategy reflects this perspective: ‘Our pre-existing security relationship with the 
EU and its Member States means that we are uniquely placed to develop and sustain a 
mutually beneficial model of cooperation in this area from outside the Union’.194 Whether it 
is the British Government or UK law enforcement (through the NCA), it is clear that the UK 
insists on its ‘unique position’ as well as a ‘new relationship’ with the EU, which suggests 
that the UK seeks to continue dealing with the EU on the basis of a new and unique 
settlement.195 The NCA suggested that the UK ‘should not look at precedent’ and ‘should be 
aiming for access and a partnership that is different from and closer than currently exists 
for any other non-member state’.196 The NCA continues: ‘One of the issues of concern for 
our “Five Eyes” partners, for instance, is that the lack of the UK at Europol will impact on 
their relationships too, because sometimes they can use us as a proxy for getting work 
done if we are doing joint work together’.197 The weight of transatlantic relations and the 
value they hold in the eyes of the UK may, however, lead to a strengthening of 
transatlantic security schemes at the expense of EU27 cooperation. But it is difficult to 
assess how far the UK’s assessment of its own value within Europol in terms of brokering 
international relationships will hold true after Brexit. 
5.2.2. Challenges for the integrity of internal EU police cooperation 
One possibility for continued cooperation through Europol is a bilateral EU-UK 
agreement.198 Europol is able to sign agreements with third countries, and a number of 
such agreements have been concluded. This has the potential of keeping the UK in the EU 
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195 House of Lords, Brexit: future UK-EU security and police cooperation, 2017, op. cit., Q26-37.  
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arena and ensuring, to some extent, legal coherence among the different players.199 There 
are two types of cooperation agreements Europol can enter into with third countries: 
strategic agreements and operational agreements. In either case, while third countries can 
deploy liaison officers, they do not have access to the EIS database or a seat on the 
Management Board.200 The major difference between the two types of agreements is that a 
strategic agreement does not allow for the exchange of personal data. Both types of 
agreements, though, need to comply with the EU Charter and may be challenged in the 
CJEU.201  
 
For the UK, opting for an operational agreement depends upon the receipt of an EU 
adequacy decision stipulating that the UK data protection framework is as protective as (or 
roughly equivalent to) EU standards. It will be extremely difficult, if not impractical, to 
secure future cooperation between the UK and Europol on the basis of the above-
mentioned types of agreements because of the divergent positions of the UK and the EU in 
relation to the rights and principles of the EU Charter and the role of the CJEU. While high 
levels of data protection are laid down in the EU Charter and the CJEU has jurisdiction over 
Europol and any ex-third pillar measures, both the EU Charter and the CJEU are no-go 
areas for the UK.202 
 
The major issues associated with future EU-UK cooperation turn on reciprocity. Depending 
on the level of access the UK has in the future to Europol, EU Member States and Europol 
itself may have more limited access to UK information. There are no provisions in the 
Europol Regulation to give access to its database to non-EU countries (or to EU Member 
States with whom Europol has specific working arrangements, like Denmark).  
 
The prospective terms of any future Europol-UK relationship may lead to the risk of the 
remaining Member States and third countries demanding to re-negotiate their terms of 
Europol participation to reflect the change in the British input to Europol and the conditions 
under which this prospectively takes place (for instance, a substantial reduction of the UK’s 
contribution to Europol in terms of information or the UK being offered more operationally 
advantageous terms than those granted to Denmark and other third countries). Providing 
the UK with a status equivalent to full membership would be a gamble for the EU: it could 
destabilise the status quo further and raise the issue of equal treatment of participating 
countries in Europol, whether EU Member States or third countries. 
 
Specifically, UK engagement within Europol under different conditions poses a double 
challenge when it comes to the storage of UK/EU information in EIS and the use of UK/EU-
owned data by the UK, other EU Member States, or Europol. The storage and use of data 
are closely related to respecting the principle of ownership of data enshrined in the Europol 
regulation. According to Rob Wainwright, some British imprint can be found in 40% of 
Europol cases.203 
  
Any future UK-Europol relationship thus raises the issue of providing for the retroactivity of 
the storage and use of data (either by the UK or Europol) transferred before the UK leaves 
the EU. The Denmark-Europol agreement stipulates that  
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[i]n case of termination, the contracting parties shall reach an agreement on the continued 
use and storage of the information that has already been communicated between them. If no 
agreement is reached, either of the two contracting parties is entitled to require that the 
information which it has communicated be destroyed or returned to the transmitting Party.204 
 
This has important implications for the significant amount of personal data exchanged 
between stakeholders and, secondly, the UK’s future position on EU standards of data 
protection. The question of what will happen to such information in the event that no 
agreement is reached before Brexit day should be clearly addressed in the Withdrawal 
Agreement in similar terms. This may help focus the negotiators in terms of reaching an 
agreement respecting the value of the information concerned to either party and the need 
to protect the integrity of EU data protection standards.   
 
Denmark gives an example of a solution nestled between third-country status and full 
Europol membership. Following Denmark’s opt-out from Justice and Home Affairs in 2015, 
Denmark re-joined Europol by signing an operational and strategic agreement in April 
2017. According to the agreement, Denmark can ‘cooperate with Europol to a level at least 
equivalent to that of third countries with which such agreements have been concluded’.205 
Denmark-Europol arrangements are tailored-made, providing specific provisions to 
Denmark that other third countries with which Europol has operational agreements do not 
enjoy. For instance, Europol appoints ‘Danish-speaking Europol staff or seconded national 
experts for treating Danish requests to input, receive, retrieve and cross-check data’.206 
Denmark may also attend, under observer status, meetings of the Management Board. The 
European Commission considers that this agreement allows for a ‘sufficient level of 
cooperation’ without amounting to full Danish membership.207 It also makes available to 
Denmark rights given to Member States (access to EIS, unreserved participation in 
Europol’s database, decision-making rights in the governing body of Europol, i.e., the 
Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security [COSI]).208 This 
‘unique status’ is based, however, on specific conditions which will not apply to the UK 
post-Brexit.209 These include continued membership of the EU and the Schengen area, 
agreement to apply CJEU jurisdiction (particularly in relation to the interpretation of and 
compliance with the agreement), and, finally, the requirement for Denmark to transpose 
Directive 2016/680/EU on data protection in police matters into domestic law by May 2017 
(which it did).210 The agreement provides for the termination of cooperation if Denmark 
ceases to be bound by the Schengen acquis. The UK could request a bespoke deal with 
Europol that reflects a higher level of cooperation than other third countries, but it is 
unlikely that any agreement with watered-down judicial oversight or personal data 
protection would survive a challenge in the CJEU.   
 
Other cooperation schemes raise similar issues in terms of compliance with EU standards. 
The Switzerland model, which allows it to participate in EU databases like SIS, is 
conditioned upon Switzerland’s involvement in the Schengen area, a situation that does not 
fit well with the UK’s preoccupation with border control, one of the main issues in the Brexit 
                                                 
204 Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between the Kingdom of Denmark and the European 
Police Office at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/agreement-operational-and-strategic-
cooperation-between-kingdom-of-denmark-and-europol. 
205 Ibid.  
206 Ibid. 
207 European Commission, Commission welcomes Europol's new mandate and cooperation agreement with 
Denmark (press release), 29.4.2017, at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-1169_en.htm.  
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President of the European Council, Donald Tusk and the Prime Minister of Denmark, Lars Løkke Rasmussen’ (press 
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referendum.211 Principles of free movement among contracting parties are also incorporated 
into an EEA-style agreement, so that would unlikely receive approval in the current UK 
political climate.212  
 
From an operational point of view, the option of bilateral agreements between individual EU 
Member States and the UK is not more appealing.213 For both British and EU practitioners, 
this would be the worst-case scenario in terms of productivity. Whereas current EU 
measures offer a coherent, speedy and EU-wide response to transnational crime, bilateral 
mechanisms (in the form of agreements on a case-by-case basis between the UK and a 
large number of the EU27) will likely slow down cooperation (exchanging information will 
take longer) and lead to fragmented responses.  
 
There is an urgent need to consider transitional arrangements for Europol-UK relations, as 
it is likely to take longer to reach an agreement than the remaining time for Article 50 
negotiations. The House of Lords reports that it takes an average of seven years to 
conclude a cooperation agreement with Europol.214 But if the UK Government maintains its 
stance on the rights and principles of the EU Charter and CJEU jurisdiction, transitional 
arrangements could face the same hurdles as a final agreement. 
 
5.3. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The main challenge of Brexit in the field of police cooperation is to safeguard the 
uninterrupted exchange of information between police forces and agencies in Europe. The 
high degree of interdependence between EU measures means that proposals will need to 
ensure continuity and coherence. Brexit could pose the risk of unravelling existing 
arrangements that enable effective, collective efforts. This will affect the relationship 
between the UK and the EU but also of the UK and the EU to global security networks. The 
negotiations will need to take into account the wider global security context as well as 
internal UK dynamics, notably between Westminster and the devolved governments, 
particularly in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The complexity of the situation requires a 
comprehensive view of the issues and actors in play.   
 
The UK likes to see itself as a global actor in this area. In the context of Brexit, some in the 
UK think that Britain can rely on other forms of cooperation to achieve a global level of 
acquisition of data. In particular, they believe that the UK can rely on Five Eyes, where the 
UK is positioned as a key intermediary between the US and the EU27, for strategic 
intelligence.215 For policing, they hope that old spheres of influence inside Interpol can be 
                                                 
211 Mitsilegas, European Criminal Law after Brexit, 2017, op. cit.  
212  Carrera,S.,  Guild, E., and  Luk Chun, N.,  ‘What does Brexit mean for the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
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area-freedom-security-and-justice. 
213 Mitsilegas, European Criminal Law after Brexit, 2017, op. cit. 
214 House of Lords, Brexit: future UK-EU security and police cooperation, 2016, op. cit., p. 18.  
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[2014], Report on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their 
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revived by reinforcing Interpol against, or at least apart from, the EU. But this nostalgic 
vision of past ties is dismissed as unrealistic by most UK practitioners who have been 
involved directly in day-to-day EU police cooperation matters and by most EU Member 
State practitioners. While the important role the UK has played is acknowledged, EU 
Member State practitioners also believe that the old-style UK pragmatic approach to police 
cooperation has put a brake on deeper and more effective EU collaboration in this sphere. 
This poses a conundrum for the EU. Should negotiations with the UK have as their goal 
ensuring continued high-level cooperation to mitigate the security risks of reduced access 
to global information? Or is it better to have a clean break from the UK to allow for stronger 
cooperation within the EU, albeit while maintaining some form of cooperation and 
information exchange with the UK as it pursues its own path outside the EU.  
 
The strong divergence on both sides in the area of police information exchange over such 
issues as sovereignty, security, and governmental privilege regarding rule of law and 
control means that the boundaries of the emergency measures taken in the name of 
antiterrorism are not the same. In some way, these attitudes over different understandings 
of sovereignty are at the very root of what has led to a so-called divorce between the UK 
and the EU.  
 
The official line from both sides is that a high level of continued cooperation is the desired 
outcome. But, unofficially, some UK officials consider their own capabilities, rightly or 
wrongly, to be much stronger than the EU27. Some officials from the EU27 see Brexit as an 
opportunity to settle the sovereignty question in an area that has been dogged by 30 years 
of multiple demands for opt-outs by UK politicians who seem to confuse the ideas of 
territorial control and supremacy of national decisions with the concept of sovereignty.216 
For some in the EU, the UK political narrative of sovereignty fails to grasp the ideal of the 
EU’s founders that shared sovereignty between Member States is a way to gain more power 
and have more effective decision making on the global stage. The negotiations will have 
very different outcomes and very different styles depending on the real motivations and 
levels of self-interest around the table.   
 
Once negotiations on the post-Brexit agreement in police matters have seriously advanced, 
it is necessary to see how any agreement will affect the normative power and relations 
between EU institutions and other international agreements where EU Member States are 
also members: their positions in global and transatlantic intelligence networks, as well as 
on global policing institutions, will depend on the success of the settlement with the UK. 
The converse is even truer for the UK if it ends up isolated. Further research on this area of 
the different types of intelligence, policing and migration, travel: networks of identification 
and surveillance in a post-Brexit context has to be done to see how ‘porous’, 
‘interdependent’ or ‘autonomous’ they are and what the outcome in terms of security for 
people living in the EU will be.  
 
Whatever the result of the negotiation, the question of interoperability between data bases 
and operational systems will be crucial. Further research on the compatibility of the UK 
projects for their own post-Brexit technical system, which the High-level expert group on 
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information systems and interoperability proposed in May 2017, is needed. Such research 
cannot be reduced to mere technicalities or the political economy of the security industry 
but also has to analyse the legal and political outcomes of every divergence for the future 
of relations at the transatlantic scale. 
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6. POLICIES CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL 
DATA FOR PURPOSES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 When the UK ceases to be a member of the EU, it will be treated as a third country, 
so any EU-UK data transfer deal for law enforcement purposes must fulfil the 
requirements of EU data protection law for third-country data transfer. 
 The best option for both sides is to have an adequacy decision in relation to UK data 
protection standards.  
 The UK Government embraced the adequacy decision scheme for future EU-UK data 
transfer for law enforcement purposes, although whether it will secure that decision 
is questionable. 
 Any future deal in facilitating data exchange between the EU and UK in the context 
of law enforcement must maintain a high standard of data protection as enshrined in 
the EU Charter.  
 The UK’s departure offers an opportunity for a new drive towards strengthened EU 
cooperation in this area. The UK has been active participant in shaping measures 
such as the former Data Retention Directive, which were criticised over their 
incompliance of the protection of privacy and personal data protection.  Therefore, 
the EU27 can seize the opportunity to adopt policies that put the protection of those 
rights at its core. 
 
The UK opted in to the previous EU data protection framework in the field of law 
enforcement through the 2014 Regulations. The 2016 Directive replaced this framework 
and provided not only rules for data exchange between law enforcement authorities, as the 
previous framework did, but also for data processing performed by those authorities. The 
UK Government could have potentially opted out from transposing this directive into UK 
national law but, instead, has chosen to transpose it by including the rules on data 
processing for law enforcement purposes in the Data Protection Bill 2017.217 It is not 
certain when the Bill will receive royal assent and become law, but there are reasons to 
anticipate this will happen by May 2018.218 If this happens, the 2016 Directive will be 
implemented into UK law through the Data Protection Bill before Brexit. This means that 
the Data Protection Bill will fall into the category of ‘retained EU law’ under the EU 
(Withdrawal) Bill. The problem here is the status after Brexit of the EU Charter, to which 
the 2016 Directive refers, and the CJEU, which interprets the 2016 Directive in light of the 
EU Charter: the EU (Withdrawal) Bill explicitly excludes the EU Charter and puts an end to 
the jurisdiction of the CJEU.219 This problem is thus how the Data Protection Bill ought to be 
                                                 
217 Data Protection Bill 2017 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/data-protection-bill-2017. 
218 Baroness Williams of Trafford, Minister of State at the Home Office, stated in her evidence before the House of 
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interpreted and how it is to be amended post-Brexit. According to the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, 
any retained EU law must be interpreted in accordance with pre-Brexit CJEU case law and 
the general principles of EU.220 The corollary effect of this interpretation provision is that 
EU-sourced law will be exempted from any changes in EU law after Brexit. Insofar as the 
legal process for amending the Data Protection Bill is concerned, the EU (Withdrawal) Bill 
confers to the Government temporary powers (two years after exit day) through secondary 
legislation to change EU-sourced law wherever it deems necessary.221 This is problematic 
not only for UK domestic law, as the Government can make changes in pre-Brexit EU law 
without parliamentary debate or scrutiny, but also for the protection of personal data in the 
UK after Brexit, as it creates uncertainty regarding the continuity of the commitments for 
that protection. 
 
Another point worth mentioning here is that the Data Protection Bill has been criticised for 
its complexity and deficient drafting.222 As it concerns data processing for law enforcement 
purposes, such criticisms have hinged on the expansive powers that it confers to the 
Secretary of State to introduce secondary legislation, as a result of which parliamentary 
scrutiny would be circumvented, and wide exemptions from data processing rules and data 
subject rights.223 In light of these criticisms, the Data Protection Bill might be subject to 
further amendments until it becomes law. Otherwise, the Bill in its current form may hinder 
the UK from achieving a positive adequacy decision. 
 
6.1. The role of the UK in the development of policies concerning 
the protection of personal data for the purposes of law enforcement 
 
The recurrent theme with regards to the UK’s participation in EU police and judicial 
cooperation is the ‘pick-and-choose’ approach. Despite this approach, the UK has been an 
influential voice in policies concerning the protection of personal data for purposes of law 
enforcement, as its support for the development of the 2016 Directive shows. Having 
underlined this support in her evidence before the House of Lords EU Committee, the UK 
Information Commissioner (ICO) Elizabeth Denham said that:  
 
the UK is pretty special, because of the level of integration we have had with the EU and our 
role in devising and developing … the law enforcement directive. We have been front and 
centre in this work, and we have a lot to be proud of in our contributions to the protection of 
personal data.224  
 
The same point in respect to the UK’s role in this area was made in the UK Government’s 
position paper on the exchange and protection of personal data, which stated that ‘the UK 
played a full and active part in negotiations for the new GDPR [General Data Protection 
Regulation] and the DPD [Data Protection Directive], and the final text reflects a number of 
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key UK priorities’.225 Brexit entails the loss of an active participant in the negotiations of EU 
instruments on the protection of personal data. 
 
Another area where policies concerning the protection of personal data are relevant is the 
use and sharing of personal data in the context of law enforcement. The UK has been a key 
player in shaping policies in this area, although sometimes in conflict with EU rules on the 
protection of personal data. The most prominent example is the now invalid Data Retention 
Directive (DRD), for which the UK was the major driving force. The DRD provided for the 
storage of individual’s telecommunications data for the purpose of possible access by police 
and security agencies in relation to an investigation, detection and prosecution of serious 
crimes.226 The UK also backed the adoption of the PNR Directive, which requires air carriers 
to make available to the authorities of Member States (in order to combat terrorism and 
serious and organised crime) a wide range of information about passengers entering or 
departing the EU, and in some cases taking intra-EU flights.227 It is hard to predict whether 
the UK’s absence would mean that policies on the use of personal data by law enforcement 
will tilt more strongly towards protection of personal data rather than enhancing security. 
While Professor Valsamis Mitsilegas shared this view in his evidence hearing before the 
House of Lords EU Affairs Committee, he added that ‘the UK absence from the negotiating 
table will be a loss for the EU and the other member states, because the UK has always 
been very constructive as a negotiator and in terms of the substance of the instruments’.228 
 
6.2. Important areas and challenges for future cooperation 
 
EU policies about the protection of personal data are a major issue for future EU-UK police 
and judicial cooperation. This cooperation has been built upon the sharing of personal data, 
which depended on the UK being an EU member. EU-UK data sharing will be hindered by 
Brexit unless the UK complies with EU law on the requirements for third-country data 
transfer. This means that EU27 law enforcement authorities can no longer access UK data 
relevant for law enforcement purposes. This can have security implications, as it would be 
less easy to find wanted persons or objects for law enforcement purposes if they are in the 
UK. The UK National Crime Agency’s 2015 Annual Report indicated that the UK Financial 
Intelligence Unity (UKFIU) received 1,566 requests for financial intelligence from its 
international partners between October 2014 and September 2015 – and almost 800 
requests came from EU Member States.229 These statistics indicate that there is a mutual 
interest in maintaining unhindered personal data transfer between the UK and the EU for 
purposes of law enforcement after Brexit in order to preserve the security of citizens. 230 
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However, there are various challenges against achieving a workable agreement. The 
following sub-sections will deal with the key challenges: (1) whether the UK after Brexit can 
satisfy the requirements for third-country data transfer under the EU legal framework for 
data protection for law enforcement purposes; and (2) whether there is a precedent for 
third-country participation in the existing EU-UK data exchange mechanisms for purposes 
of law enforcement. 
 
6.2.1. Requirements for data transfer to a third country 
The implementation of the 2016 Directive in UK law does not mean that after Brexit data 
will continue to flow to the UK from the EU. Once the UK leaves the EU, it becomes a third 
country under the terms of the 2016 Directive and thus falls within that Directive’s 
provisions regarding the transfer of personal data to third countries.231 According to these 
provisions, data transfer is an exception; it can be done if the requirements laid out in the 
2016 Directive are met. Therefore, data may only be transferred if it is necessary for the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and prevention of threats to public 
security. Moreover, the data controller in the third country must fulfil the requirements 
under the directive of a controller.232 Data transfer can also take place on the basis of an 
adequacy finding by the European Commission.233 Such a finding establishes that the third 
country offers an equivalent standard of data protection to what is available within the 
EU.234 An adequacy finding enables the transfer of personal data between EU Member 
States and the third country without any further authorisation.235 The 2016 Directive 
further prohibits the third country from the onward transfer of data to another third country 
that does not offer the required data protection standards under EU law.236 
 
The 2016 Directive provides the fundamental criteria which the European Commission has 
to take into consideration when carrying out an adequacy assessment. An assessment must 
consider the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the third 
country’s legislation on national security and criminal law, its international commitments in 
relation to personal data protection, the existence and effectiveness of independent 
supervisory authority for data protection, the existence of effective and enforceable data 
subject rights, and effective administrative and judicial redress.237 This adequacy 
assessment by the European Commission does not merely check the bits of data protection 
legislation of the third country; rather, it takes a comprehensive look at that country’s data 
protection legislation, including the legal framework for which data are processed for 
national security purposes. 
    
The Directive further gives the European Commission the task of ongoing monitoring on the 
functioning of the third-country adequacy decision and carrying out periodic surveys of 
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developments in that country.238 If the European Commission decides that the third country 
no longer provides an adequate level of protection, it can repeal, amend, or suspend the 
adequacy decision. As a consequence, data cannot be transferred to that country except in 
the limited circumstances for which data transfer is permitted without having to rely on an 
adequacy scheme. According to Article 35(1) (d) of the 2016 Directive, Member States can 
transfer personal data in the absence of an adequacy scheme if the recipient authority 
offers appropriate safeguards in accordance with the conditions laid out in Article 37. 
Additionally, under limited circumstances laid out in Article 38, Member States can transfer 
personal data in the absence of both an adequacy scheme and appropriate safeguards 
offered by the recipient authority. 
 
If the EU is to retain data flows for the purposes of law enforcement to the UK, the UK will 
have to comply with the requirements for transfer of data to a third country. Therefore, the 
UK will have to seek an adequacy decision by the European Commission and prepare itself 
for scrutiny of its data protection framework by the Commission. Otherwise, transfer of 
data for the purposes of law enforcement will be hindered except in the limited 
circumstances mentioned above. Transferring data under these circumstances is not ideal 
because there is less legal certainty for the law enforcement authorities of the EU Member 
States than a comprehensive adequacy decision.239 For its part, the UK Government does 
not favour such an outcome because the ability to transfer data under these circumstances 
are more limited than under an adequacy decision.240 Equally important is the prohibition 
that the UK cannot transfer data to another third country whose data protection standards 
do not meet EU standards. This, in turn, could cause problems with the UK sharing EU-
originated data with a third country for the purposes of law enforcement cooperation. This 
problem is all the more serious with regards to the UK’s law enforcement cooperation with 
the US: when the UK ceases to be a member of the EU, the EU-US Umbrella Agreement, 
the framework for EU-US data transfers for purposes of law enforcement, will not apply to 
it.241 The UK Government’s position is that data flows between the UK and third countries 
with existing EU adequacy decisions can continue on the same basis after the UK’s 
withdrawal, given that such transfers could conceivably include EU data.242 To do this, the 
UK Government said that it intends to ‘liaise with those third countries to ensure that 
existing arrangements will be transitioned over at the point of exit’.243 This seems to imply 
that the UK may seek an umbrella-style agreement with the US in order to secure its data 
exchanges with the US. 
 
There are some potential obstacles to confirming that UK data protection standards offer an 
equivalent standard of protection to that available in the EU. The surveillance practices of 
the UK’s intelligence agency, General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), are the first 
obstacle. An adequacy finding by the European Commission includes the assessment of a 
third country’s legal framework for data processing for national security purposes, which 
means that these surveillance practices will come under the spotlight. Had the UK stayed in 
the EU, these activities would never have been the subject of scrutiny by the EU because 
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national security is outside the scope of EU law. However, the CJEU’s Schrems decision, 
which considered the legality of the European Commission’s adequacy finding of the ‘Safe 
Harbour’ principles scheme that enabled data transfers from the EU to US businesses, 
shows that the surveillance practices of a third-country intelligence agency can become a 
cause of concern for cross-border data transfer.244 When analysing whether US law offered 
an adequate level of protection, the Court questioned the extent of possible national 
security derogations and their interferences with the fundamental rights of the persons 
whose data were transferred from the EU to the US.245 The Court invalidated the European 
Commission’s adequacy decision on the ground that there was an insufficient examination 
of the powers of the US National Security Agency (NSA) to access the personal data of EU 
citizens once they reach US shores.246 As a consequence, how UK intelligence agencies can 
get access to individual personal data must also be taken into account when considering 
the level of protection afforded by UK laws for personal data falling within the scope of the 
2016 Directive. Here, attention must be paid to the ongoing legal challenges before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and domestic challenges to UK surveillance 
practices.247 The UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), which oversees the surveillance 
practices of UK public authorities, has examined the application of EU law on the practice of 
UK intelligence agencies accessing communications data (data related to who called whom, 
when, and where) in bulk for the purposes of national security.248 The IPT held – seemingly 
by the agreement of all parties – that CJEU should decide on the legality of the practice of 
accessing communications data in bulk for the purposes of national security but refused to 
expedite referral to CJEU. Even though a CJEU decision may take some time to be made, 
the CJEU is expected to have an important impact on the future of EU-UK data transfer. 
Moreover, although the Data Protection Bill introduces data processing rules for intelligence 
agencies in light of the Council of Europe’s Convention on automatic processing of data, it 
is questionable whether these rules would be sufficient to prove that the UK provides the 
required level of personal data protection.249 These rules complement other UK legislation 
on intelligence services, such as the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA), whose impact in terms 
of securing an adequacy decision for the UK is discussed below, and this other legislation 
provides for national security exemptions.250 Additionally, the provisions under which 
intelligence can be shared with authorities outside the UK falls short of providing minimum 
safeguards for protecting personal data and privacy.251 
 
The second obstacle to a positive adequacy finding is the UK’s data retention regime and 
the CJEU’s decision in Tele2 and Watson, where the 2014 Data Retention and Investigatory 
Powers Act (DRIPA) came under the Court’s scrutiny.252 The DRIPA was rushed into the UK 
Parliament in 2014 after the CJEU had struck down the DRD in its Digital Rights Ireland 
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245 Ibid. paragraphs 84-88. 
246 Ibid. paragraphs 88-90 and 97-98. 
247 For the ECtHR, see Big Brother and Others v. the United Kingdom (Communication Case) (Application No 
58170/13); Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice Ross v. the United Kingdom (Communication Case) 
(Application No. 62322/14); 10 Human Rights Organisations v. the United Kingdom (Communication Case) 
(Application No. 24960/15); for the UK, see Privacy International v. Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs et al. [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH; and Privacy International, Bulk Personal Datasets 
Challenge. Avaialable at: https://privacyinternational.org/node/843. 
248 Privacy International v. Secretary of State, op. cit.,  ‘Tribunal says EU judges should rule on legality of UK 
surveillance powers’, The Guardian, 8.09.2017   at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/08/snoopers-
charter-tribunal-eu-judges-mass-data-surveillance. 
249 Data Protection Bill, part 4. 
250 Ibid. part 4, chapter 6.  
251 ‘Briefing on the Data Protection Bill’, Privacy International, 2017, op. cit., pp. 10-13.  
252 CJEU, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post– och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom 
Watson and Others, 2016, C-203/15. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 64 
decision.253 The CJEU invalidated the DRD because it decided that indiscriminate data 
retention practices aimed at combating terrorism and serious crime were disproportionate 
and violated the right to privacy and personal data protection of EU citizens.254 The 2014 
DRIPA reinstated the data retention provisions of the now invalid Data Retention Directive. 
Its legality was challenged in the CJEU in the joined cases of Tele2 and Watson on the 
grounds that it violated the right to privacy and data protection. On 21 December 2016, 
only a few days before DRIPA expired, the CJEU delivered its much-awaited judgment. 
Affirming its decision on the Data Retention Directive, the CJEU held that EU law precluded 
general and indiscriminate retention regimes because they exceeded ‘the limit of what is 
strictly necessary and cannot be considered to be justified, within a democratic society.’255 
 
The following are the key findings of Tele2 and Watson: 
 
 The data retention regime must be limited to the purpose of combating serious 
crime rather than ordinary crime.256 
 Only targeted data retention regimes are permissible under EU law insofar as they 
limited that retention in relation to ‘categories of data to be retained, the means of 
communication affected, the persons concerned and the retention period adopted, to 
what is strictly necessary’.257 In order to meet the strict necessity requirement, the 
regime in question must provide ‘clear and precise rules governing the scope and 
application of such a data retention measure and impos[e] minimum safeguards, so 
that the persons whose data has been retained have sufficient guarantees of the 
effective protection of their personal data against the risk of misuse’.258 Moreover, 
there has to be ‘a connection between the data to be retained and the objective 
pursued’.259  
 Access to data by law enforcement can only be granted for retained data of persons 
who are suspected of planning, committing or having committed a serious crime or 
of being implicated in one way or another in such a crime.260   
 Access to data must be subject to a prior review carried out by a court or an 
independent administrative body.261 
 Individuals in respect of which retained information is accessed by public authorities 
must be notified once such notification can no longer jeopardise the investigation.262 
 
The CJEU referred the case back to the UK Court of Appeal for a decision on the extent to 
which DRIPA was consistent with EU requirements.263 In the meantime, DRIPA was 
repealed and replaced, from 1 January 2017, by IPA. However, Tele2 and Watson will 
inevitably have an impact on this Act.264 The IPA provides data retention powers similar to, 
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and in some instances, more extensive than those provided under DRIPA.265 It allows for 
access to retained communications data for purposes other than combating serious crime, 
such as public health protection and tax assessment.266 It provides several categories of 
bulk warrants that do not have to be limited to particular people, times, and geographical 
areas; these warrants are, by default, not targeted.267 Access to communications data is 
not subjected to prior judicial review, except where it is granted by local authorities.268 The 
IPA does not provide for any notification procedure for individuals. It flows from these 
observations that IPA contains some provisions which are not reconciled with the CJEU’s 
findings in Tele2 and Watson. Therefore, unless the IPA is revisited in light of those 
findings, a positive adequacy finding in relation to the UK’s data protection standards might 
be unlikely after Brexit. In fact, the judicial review proceedings against IPA at the national 
level helps position the controversies surrounding this Act.269 
 
Thirdly, the UK’s attitude towards CJEU decisions might be problematic in satisfying the 
requisite data protection standards for data transfer. According to the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, 
the EU Charter and CJEU decisions will no longer be applicable in the UK after Brexit.270 Yet 
it would be impossible to disregard those decisions with regards to privacy and data 
protection. CJEU will interpret the 2016 Directive in light of the EU Charter. This means that 
when assessing the adequacy of data protection standards afforded in a third country under 
the 2016 Directive, the European Commission will do so in light of the CJEU’s interpretation 
of the Directive. The impact on a non-EU country of the EU Charter and CJEU’s privacy and 
data protection decisions was evident in Schrems. The Court held that a non-EU country (in 
this case, the US) must demonstrate ‘a level of protection of fundamental rights essentially 
equivalent to that guaranteed in the EU legal order’ and that CJEU had the jurisdiction to 
decide whether the transfer of personal data to that country complies with EU law.271 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the IPT accepted that the CJEU should decide on the 
legality of the practice of UK intelligence agencies of accessing communications data in bulk 
for national security purposes. Therefore, the UK will need to take into account CJEU 
decisions, particularly those relating to privacy and data protection, after Brexit. 
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The UK Government is keen on maintaining data transfers for the purposes of law 
enforcement after Brexit.272 It has also confirmed that it will achieve this goal by way of 
seeking an adequacy decision.273 More importantly, it is confident that the UK will secure a 
positive adequacy finding because it would have already implemented the 2016 Directive 
through Data Protection Bill, through which the UK law on data protection will be in line 
with the new EU data protection regime.  
 
There are two issues worth mentioning here. The first is that the UK Government does not 
mention its data retention regime, which could be an obstacle in securing a positive 
adequacy decision. That said, the UK Government highlighted its view of a UK-EU data 
transfer as respecting UK sovereignty, ‘including the UK’s ability to protect the security of 
its citizens and its ability to maintain and develop its position as a leader in data 
protection’.274 This suggests that the UK Government would stick to its position when its 
data retention regime is brought to the negotiation table. 
 
The second issue is that maintaining data transfer on the basis of that decision does not 
promise to be smooth after Brexit because the legal process involved in reaching that 
decision might take some time. Although there has not been an adequacy decision made in 
accordance with the 2016 Directive, the timeframe for reaching adequacy decisions in 
relation to data transfers for commercial purposes under the Data Protection Directive275, 
which is still in force at the time of writing and is due to be replaced by the General Data 
Protection Regulation in May 2018, can give an indication of the time it will take to reach an 
adequacy decision under the 2016 Directive, as both Directives provide for the same legal 
process for an adequacy decision finding (i.e., the procedure for the European 
Commission’s implementing acts).276 For Switzerland, the average time for reaching an 
adequacy decision was one year.277 Moreover, the UK can only seek an adequacy decision 
once it ceases to be a member of the EU, so any decision cannot be made before Brexit. All 
this raises the issue of seeking a transitional arrangement in relation to data transfer for 
law enforcement purposes into the Withdrawal Agreement so that any transfers are not 
interrupted pending an adequacy decision for the UK.278 Although not mentioned expressly, 
the UK Government hinted in its position paper on the exchange and protection of personal 
data that it welcomes such an arrangement. In that position paper, it called for an early 
agreement in mutually recognising ‘each other’s data protection frameworks as a basis for 
the continued free flows of data between the EU (and other EU adequate countries) and the 
UK from the point of exit, until such time as new and more permanent arrangements come 
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into force’.279 In Prime Minister Theresa May’s speech in Florence, she asked the EU27 to 
agree on a two-year transitional period after Brexit, which indicates the UK Government’s 
intention to rely on transitional arrangements if necessary.280 
 
There are, though, two problems about possible transitional arrangements for UK-EU data 
transfers. One problem is that these arrangements do not abolish the risk of a negative 
adequacy decision for the UK or a legal challenge against a positive adequacy decision. The 
other problem is that the UK considers CJEU jurisdiction and the application of the EU 
Charter as redline, risking a possible rejection by the UK on any expansion of the EU 
Charter or CJEU jurisdiction for the duration of the transitional arrangements. This could 
frustrate reaching any such arrangements in the first place. Besides, transitional 
arrangements have to correspond with EU standards in general and those of data 
protection in particular, which indicates that the adequacy requirements would prevail in 
striking any arrangement.281 
 
If the two-year period under Article 50 of TEU is extended to cover the transitional period, 
or the UK-EU data transfer are included in the transitional arrangements, EU law will apply 
to the UK and the personal data will continue to flow in the interim period. In the absence 
of any transitional arrangements, be it under Article 50 or under a withdrawal agreement, 
the safest option for the protection of personal data is to transfer personal data from the 
EU to the UK on the basis of the limited circumstances under the 2016 Directive (Articles 
35, 37, and 38) until an adequacy decision is reached for the data protection in the UK. 
 
6.2.2. UK access to EU law enforcement databases 
The UK participates in the following EU measures on data exchange in the field of law 
enforcement: SIS II, ECRIS, EU PNR, and the Prüm Decision. Withdrawal from the EU 
means that the UK will no longer have access to the information held in these databases. 
Whether this will have security implications for the EU depends on whether the UK’s 
participation in these databases is a benefit for the EU.  
 
In relation to SIS II, the UK received over 150,000 alerts from other Member States, 
representing 0.22% of the total 700 million alerts issued in the calendar year 2016.282 In 
the same timeframe, the UK had the second-most accesses to SIS II, with over 510 million 
access times, representing 12.9% of the over 3.98 billion total access times.283 These data 
show that the UK has heavily relied on SIS II, whose utilisation is also linked with EAW (it 
is the mechanism through which information on an EAW is sent).284 In his evidence before 
the House of Lords EU Affairs Committee, David Armond, Deputy Director-General of the 
NCA, said of SIS II:  
 
[U]ntil recently, only one third of European arrest warrants were on the Police National 
Computer in this country because it was not clear whether the person named was likely to 
be in the UK. Now we have visibility of all European arrest warrants, and it is for that 
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reason that last year we saw a 25% increase in the number of those warrants executed 
and people arrested.285  
 
As a consequence, the lack of UK participation in SIS II after Brexit will make it harder to 
find wanted persons if they are in the UK.  
   
With regards to ECRIS, UK participation in this database is of great importance for the 
EU27. In 2016 the UK was the second-most active Member State (after Germany) to ECRIS 
in terms of total volume of notifications on new convictions, requests and replies to 
requests, representing 13.7% of nearly 2 million notifications.286 That same year it was also 
the second-most active Member State in requesting information on previous convictions 
(26.7%).287 Moreover, the UK was one of the Member States with the highest number of 
operational interconnections, receiving 13,220 of nearly 365,000 requests for information 
from other Member States in 2016.288  
 
As far as the UK’s participation in the Prüm Decision goes, there is no information about 
how the UK utilises this database because it has yet to connect to the database in 2017 and 
is only due to fully participate in it in 2020.289 Along the same lines, the implementation of 
the EU PNR Directive is due in May 2018, so there are no statistics on Member State usage 
of the PNR Scheme. Yet because the UK began using and collecting PNR data for law 
enforcement purposes over a decade ago, it can be said to be a front-runner in using PNR 
data.290 As the first Member State to set up a PNR scheme, the UK’s importance for the 
EU27 in relation to the EU PNR Scheme lies in its expertise and experience. 
 
The UK’s participation in EU law enforcement databases has operational significance in 
terms of the volume of information sent and received and because of the UK’s expertise 
and experience. However, there are two obstacles to the continuity of the UK’s participation 
in these databases. The first obstacle is that there is no precedent in some of the databases 
for access by non-EU (ECRIS) and non-Schengen (SIS II) countries. Participant countries 
have access to these databases either because they are EU Member States or they have 
joined the Schengen acquis (such as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland). As 
far as the Prüm goes, non-EU Member States who have secured participation (Iceland and 
Norway) are also members of Schengen acquis. Yet the fact that the Prüm decision itself 
does not form part of the Schengen acquis suggests that the UK could participate in it on 
the basis of an international agreement reached after Brexit in relation to TFEU Article 216 
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regardless of its non-participation in the Schengen acquis.291 Iceland and Norway, after two 
years of negotiations, signed international agreements on their participation.292 
Nevertheless, it is premature to speculate about the benefits for the EU27 of UK 
participation because the UK has not fully participated in the Prüm yet. 
 
The second obstacle is that even if the UK can conclude an agreement with the EU on data 
transfer for the purposes of law enforcement, it will still have to prove that it maintains an 
equivalent level of data protection as the EU. As the CJEU’s opinion on the EU-Canada PNR 
Agreement demonstrates, an agreement can be challenged before the CJEU and struck 
down.293 Moreover, this opinion is of great importance for the future of any PNR data 
transfer deal with the UK. The CJEU held that the PNR data transfer scheme provided under 
that agreement was incompatible with privacy and data protection rights enshrined under 
the EU Charter. This decision demonstrates the need to closely evaluate the EU PNR 
scheme and PNR data transfer agreements with third countries in light of the EU Charter.294 
 
6.3. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU means that UK-EU data sharing for law enforcement 
purposes will be hindered unless the UK demonstrates that it will afford equivalent personal 
data protection to that which is available in the EU. As a non-EU third country, the UK will 
be required to meet higher standards than EU Member States. It will no longer be able to 
rely on the national security exemption, and thus its surveillance and data retention 
schemes will come under scrutiny.295 Additionally, the EU Charter and CJEU decisions on 
privacy and data protection will have bearing for the UK, albeit indirectly.  
 
If the UK wishes to retain or replace its participation in or access to existing EU measures 
on data exchange for law enforcement purposes after Brexit, the recurring theme is that its 
data protection standards will have to be adequate compared to those of the EU. As 
Schrems and the CJEU’s opinion on the EU-Canada PNR Agreement, failure to comply with 
EU data protection standards has major consequences for the future relationship between 
the EU and UK in this sensitive area of law enforcement.  
 
The UK Government has confirmed that it will align its national law with the 2016 Directive. 
However, its position after Brexit is less clear. It has not confirmed whether it will seek an 
adequacy decision when the UK ceases to be a member of the EU. The best option for both 
sides is to have an adequacy decision for UK data protection standards after Brexit and, in 
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the meantime, rely on the provisions in the 2016 Directive on the circumstances in which 
data can be transferred outside an adequacy scheme.  
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7. CONCLUSION
At this stage, it is difficult to assess the impact Brexit will have on the AFSJ. Over the years 
the UK has been ambivalent in its engagement with the AFSJ. It has provided political and 
practical leadership in some areas, particularly in the operational field for Europol and 
Eurojust, but it has blocked developments or stood aside in other areas. The implications of 
Brexit for the EU are complex. The EU’s negotiating position in the various areas covered 
by the AFSJ will require a careful analysis of the risks and opportunities for the EU and its 
Member States, which may not always have shared interests. There may be a need to 
balance immediate operational needs with wider implications for policy development and 
greater integration in the EU. 
On an operational level, to ensure that continued bilateral cooperation is possible after 
Brexit, there is an urgent need to address some legal issues relating to cross-border 
cooperation, whether at an institutional level (such as agreements with Eurojust) or at a 
Member State level. The technical issues of transitional provisions to be included in the 
Withdrawal Agreement should be discussed as soon as possible in order to provide legal 
certainty for ongoing proceedings.  
Many of the AFSJ areas affect the daily lives of people. Family law should not be considered 
an area of negotiation subject only to the principle of reciprocity. Whatever the UK position 
in this area might be, European families should not be held hostage to the political 
turbulence surrounding Brexit. The EU should explore ways of ensuring, to as great an 
extent as possible, legal certainty in the EU27 following Brexit. 
The EU will need to bear in mind the implications of the decisions it makes on the AFSJ for 
the integrity of EU law. To ensure that Brexit does not weaken the foundations of the AFSJ 
itself, the importance of the role of the CJEU and the rights and principles set out in the EU 
Charter need to be fundamental. 
This study makes the following recommendations: 
On border checks, asylum and immigration, including free movement of persons: 
 An agreement which protects the rights in course of being acquired and exercised by
citizens of the EU28 Member States (whether EU27 citizens in the UK or British citizens
in the EU27) should be a priority;
 The cut-off date for the acquisition of rights should be no earlier than the date Brexit
actually happens;
 Supranational adjudication of disputes, accessible to national courts through a reference
procedure, is critical to the correct application of any agreement.
On judicial cooperation: 
 Article 50 negotiations should, as soon as possible, address the question of transitional
arrangements for judicial cooperation in the Withdrawal Agreement, setting out detailed
proposals on the cut-off point for ongoing proceedings to continue under existing
arrangements so as to ensure legal certainty.
 Eurojust should notify the Council as soon as possible of its plans to negotiate an
agreement with the UK following withdrawal and start the process required to conclude
such an agreement in parallel to Article 50 negotiations.
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 EU27 Member States should identify any areas in their domestic legislation that may
require amendment to rely on alternative international or regional frameworks for
continued cooperation with the UK and make preparations for such amendments.
 The EU should explore and identify at an early stage any potential barriers to reaching
an agreement with the UK for a new instrument to replace the EAW and other mutual
recognition instruments, based on the model for Norway and Iceland.
 The EU should explore the possibility of the UK adhering to the Lugano Convention
following Brexit, identifying the potential legal requirements needed for this to occur.
 To ensure the best possible outcomes for families and children, the EU should carry out
a gap analysis in relation to civil cooperation on family law to identify particular
vulnerabilities and priorities for agreement.
On police cooperation: 
 Consideration should be given to how the withdrawal and future agreements will affect
the normative power and relations between EU institutions and other international
agreements in which EU Member States are also members as well as the position of EU
Member States in global and transatlantic intelligence networks, as well as global
policing institutions.
 The question of interoperability between data bases and operational systems should be
kept at the forefront of discussions in this area.
On personal data protection: 
 The best option for both sides is to rely on an adequacy finding by the European
Commission on the basis of Article 36 of the 2016 Directive.
 In an alternative scenario in which the EU enters into an international agreement with
the UK on data exchange in the field of law enforcement, EU primary law such as the EU
Charter and CJEU case law should be taken into account.
 The Withdrawal Agreement should include reference to the future of the EU-UK data
exchange for law enforcement purposes. Transitional arrangements must correspond
with EU standards in general and those of data protection in particular.
 The safest option for protecting the fundamental rights of individuals whose personal
data have been transferred to the UK in the interim period is to rely on the limited
circumstances under the 2016 Directive (Articles 35, 37, and 38) in which data can be
transferred outside the adequacy scheme.
 The EU must pay particular attention to discussions surrounding legal challenges to UK
surveillance practices - an insufficient consideration of these practices means that any
future arrangement on EU-UK data transfer for law enforcement purposes after Brexit,
be it an adequacy finding by the European Commission or an international agreement
signed by both parties, may face a legal challenge before the CJEU and risk being
declared void.
 Attention must be paid to the level of protection afforded to the personal data in the UK
in reaching an international agreement with the UK on the transfer of personal data.
The European Parliament should not approve an international agreement if it believes
that UK data protection standards are not equivalent to those in the EU.
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